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ABSTRACT	  	   From	  2011	  to	  2012,	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  (MID)	  and	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  (SFPUC)	  attempted	  to	  broker	  a	  deal	  that	  would	  transfer	  water	  from	  the	  rural	  Central	  California	  district	  to	  the	  metropolitan	  Bay	  Area.	  With	  a	  contract	  length	  of	  50	  years,	  it	  represented	  the	  type	  of	  long-­‐term	  agricultural-­‐to-­‐urban	  water	  deal	  many	  experts	  had	  long	  anticipated	  occurring	  in	  Northern	  California,	  and	  might	  open	  the	  door	  for	  larger	  transfer	  deals	  in	  the	  region.	  Such	  transfers	  had	  been	  extolled	  for	  years	  by	  economists,	  policymakers,	  and	  even	  some	  environmentalists	  as	  an	  optimal	  way	  to	  manage	  scarce	  water	  resources	  among	  a	  variety	  of	  interests.	  This	  optimism	  was	  countered	  by	  those	  fearing	  potential	  social,	  economic,	  and	  environmental	  harm	  that	  such	  deals	  would	  bring	  upon	  those	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiation,	  known	  as	  “third	  parties,”	  and	  literature	  suggested	  these	  third-­‐party	  concerns	  were	  a	  major	  hurdle	  in	  completing	  transfer	  deals.	  	  The	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  proposal	  fell	  through	  in	  September	  of	  2012,	  and	  this	  thesis	  set	  out	  to	  explore	  the	  key	  factors	  in	  its	  collapse	  using	  an	  institutional	  framework.	  Analyzing	  data	  collected	  through	  detailed	  interviews	  and	  primary	  sources,	  this	  thesis	  concluded	  that	  third-­‐party	  concerns	  played	  only	  a	  tertiary	  role	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  Far	  more	  consequential	  factors	  were	  rifts	  within	  the	  MID,	  caused	  in	  large	  part	  by	  the	  election	  of	  a	  board	  member	  adamantly	  opposed	  to	  the	  transfer,	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  legal	  action	  by	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  already	  engaged	  in	  a	  contract	  with	  the	  MID.	  These	  spheres	  of	  conflict—within	  the	  negotiating	  agency,	  among	  contractual	  partners,	  and	  outside	  by	  third	  parties—combined	  to	  scuttle	  the	  deal.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failed	  transfer,	  the	  two	  agencies	  are	  taking	  two	  very	  different	  paths	  forward,	  with	  the	  SFPUC	  considering	  a	  similar	  water	  deal	  with	  a	  different	  irrigation	  district	  while	  the	  MID,	  after	  an	  overhaul	  of	  personnel,	  will	  tackle	  its	  challenges	  with	  a	  completely	  new	  management	  approach.	  The	  thesis	  concludes	  with	  recommendations	  for	  those	  in	  the	  water	  management	  field,	  the	  most	  significant	  regarding	  the	  importance	  of	  dry	  year	  arrangements	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  institutional	  leveraging.	  	  Thesis	  Supervisor:	  James	  Wescoat	  Title:	  Aga	  Khan	  Professor	  of	  Architecture	  	  Thesis	  Reader:	  Lawrence	  Susskind	  Title:	  Ford	  Professor	  of	  Urban	  and	  Environmental	  Planning
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  research	  from	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  within	  and	  from	  without.	  Within,	  because	  I	  am	  a	  native	  Californian,	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  Southern	  California,	  and	  recently	  living	  several	  years	  in	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Bay	  Area.	  Water	  has	  always	  been	  a	  fascinating	  element	  to	  me,	  growing	  up	  in	  a	  place	  where	  signs	  and	  stories	  convey	  how	  this	  crucial	  force	  means	  so	  much	  to	  so	  many	  different	  people.	  My	  research	  also	  comes	  from	  without,	  as	  I	  developed	  this	  thesis	  while	  at	  school	  in	  Massachusetts	  and,	  other	  than	  a	  month	  spent	  in	  California	  conducting	  interviews,	  composed	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  work	  on	  the	  east	  coast.	  New	  England	  is	  an	  environment	  that	  experiences	  water,	  and	  rights	  to	  water,	  much	  differently,	  which	  has	  permitted	  me	  to	  understand	  water	  management	  with	  a	  more	  nuanced	  perspective.	  Combined	  with	  experiences	  living	  and	  working	  in	  diverse	  places	  such	  as	  Chile,	  Thailand,	  Haiti,	  and	  Ghana,	  I	  have	  learned	  firsthand	  the	  importance	  of	  well-­‐managed	  water,	  and	  seek	  to	  integrate	  this	  into	  my	  future	  endeavors.	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ACRONYMS	  AND	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  af	   	   acre-­‐feet	  ARTDA	   Amended	  Restated	  Treatment	  and	  Delivery	  Agreement	  BAWSCA	   Bay	  Area	  Water	  Supply	  and	  Conservation	  Agency	  CA	   	   California	  CEQA	   	   California	  Environmental	  Quality	  Act	  DWR	   	   Department	  of	  Water	  Resources	  EIR	   	   environmental	  impact	  report	  FERC	   	   Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  GM	   	   General	  Manager	  mgd	   	   millions	  of	  gallons	  a	  day	  MID	   	   Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  OID	   	   Oakdale	  Irrigation	  District	  NRC	   	   National	  Resource	  Council	  PEIR	   	   Program	  Environmental	  Impact	  Report	  PAC	   	   Public	  Action	  Committee	  SFPUC	  	   San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  SPUR	   	   San	  Francisco	  Planning	  &	  Urban	  Research	  Association	  SWRCB	   State	  Water	  Resources	  Control	  Board	  	  TID	   	   Turlock	  Irrigation	  District	  	  TRT	   	   Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  UCSB	   	   University	  of	  California	  at	  Santa	  Barbara	  WSIP	   	   Water	  System	  Improvement	  Program	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  	  	   California	  has	  a	  complicated	  relationship	  with	  water	  that	  only	  looks	  to	  grow	  more	  challenging	  in	  the	  years	  ahead.	  The	  mix	  of	  a	  growing	  population,	  land	  development,	  ecosystem	  decline,	  and	  a	  changing	  climate—bringing	  with	  it	  increased	  drought	  and	  less	  reliable	  snowmelt—has	  only	  increased	  the	  tension	  among	  water’s	  many	  stakeholders	  in	  California.	  Debate	  persists	  and	  decisions	  continue	  to	  be	  postponed	  regarding	  the	  management	  of	  this	  precious	  resource	  involved	  in	  agriculture,	  energy,	  industry,	  fishing,	  tourism	  and	  recreation,	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  consumption.	  	  	   This	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  a	  proposed	  solution	  for	  grappling	  with	  water	  conflicts	  in	  California,	  and	  its	  complications	  in	  one	  particular	  scenario.	  Water	  transfers,	  in	  which	  water	  rights	  are	  leased	  on	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  or	  sold	  entirely	  from	  one	  user	  to	  another	  within	  a	  water	  market,	  are	  becoming	  a	  more	  appealing	  prescription	  by	  not	  only	  economists	  but	  policymakers	  and	  even	  environmentalists.	  Indeed,	  ever	  since	  the	  severe	  drought	  of	  the	  late	  1970s,	  California	  has	  made	  the	  facilitation	  of	  water	  exchanges	  through	  a	  water	  market	  part	  of	  its	  official	  policy.	  Though	  the	  amount	  of	  water	  exchanged	  each	  year	  has	  climbed	  to	  over	  1	  million	  acre-­‐feet,	  this	  represents	  only	  3%	  of	  the	  water	  used	  in	  the	  state	  among	  municipalities,	  industry,	  and	  the	  agriculture	  sector.1	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  state	  that	  the	  domestic	  use	  of	  water	  is	  its	  highest	  beneficial	  use,	  followed	  next	  by	  agriculture.2	  Surprisingly,	  a	  minority	  of	  market	  transactions	  has	  involved	  cities	  acquiring	  agricultural	  water,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  long-­‐term	  transfers.	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   For	  this	  reason,	  a	  proposed	  transfer	  between	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  and	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  in	  2012	  garnered	  much	  attention,	  as	  it	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  usher	  in	  a	  new	  era	  of	  large,	  long-­‐term	  transfers	  of	  water	  from	  irrigation	  to	  urban	  use.	  This	  was	  the	  type	  of	  transfer	  many	  water	  experts	  had	  long	  predicted	  might	  occur,	  as	  rural	  areas	  with	  an	  abundance	  of	  water	  looking	  to	  generate	  revenue	  would	  sell	  to	  wealthy	  urban	  centers	  looking	  to	  bolster	  their	  water	  supply.	  Few	  precedents	  existed	  in	  California,	  and	  San	  Francisco	  had	  never	  engaged	  in	  a	  water	  transfer	  before.	  Though	  the	  transfer	  initially	  had	  momentum	  and	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  foregone	  conclusion,	  talks	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  stalled	  and	  faltered	  before	  abruptly	  being	  terminated.	  Exploring	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  water	  deal’s	  failure	  in	  the	  context	  of	  California	  water	  management	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  Historical	  overview	  of	  water	  reallocation	  in	  California	  	   In	  California,	  water	  rights	  were	  established	  during	  the	  Gold	  Rush	  era	  using	  the	  “first	  in	  time,	  first	  in	  right”	  approach	  that	  emerged	  among	  mining	  operations	  on	  public	  land.	  
Figure	  1:	  Where	  SF	  gets	  its	  water,	  also	  showing	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  and	  Modesto	  (Source:	  SF	  Chronicle)	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Whoever	  claimed	  the	  water	  first	  and	  used	  it	  earned	  the	  right	  to	  the	  water.	  This	  system	  of	  prior	  appropriation	  required	  that	  water	  be	  put	  to	  a	  “beneficial	  use”—physically	  diverted	  from	  its	  course	  for	  an	  economic	  purpose—in	  order	  for	  claimants	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  their	  water	  rights.3	  Many	  of	  these	  early	  rights,	  and	  the	  incentives	  to	  divert	  water	  or	  else	  risk	  losing	  it,	  continue	  today.	  The	  landscape	  of	  California’s	  surface	  water	  network	  changed	  significantly	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  1902	  federal	  Reclamation	  Act.	  It	  subsidized	  the	  construction	  of	  massive	  infrastructure	  projects	  across	  the	  nation	  including	  major	  dams	  and	  aqueducts.4	  California	  in	  particular	  benefitted	  from	  this	  new	  wave	  of	  construction,	  as	  a	  federal	  agency	  rivalry	  between	  the	  U.S.	  Army	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	  and	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation	  resulted	  in	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  channels	  through	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  state	  that	  helped	  deliver	  water	  from	  the	  mountains	  in	  the	  North	  to	  the	  arid	  Central	  Valley	  and	  facilitated	  the	  growth	  of	  an	  enormous	  agricultural	  industry.5	  	  Meanwhile,	  fast-­‐growing	  cities	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  San	  Francisco	  pursued	  controversial	  projects	  to	  secure	  plentiful	  water	  supplies	  for	  their	  booming	  populations.	  In	  addition	  to	  tapping	  into	  the	  Colorado	  River	  to	  the	  east,	  Los	  Angeles	  made	  one	  of	  history’s	  most	  notorious	  water	  grabs	  when	  it	  bought	  the	  rights	  to	  all	  of	  the	  water	  in	  the	  Owens	  River	  Valley	  (by	  acquiring	  the	  adjacent	  land)	  and	  then	  rerouted	  the	  river	  over	  200	  miles	  through	  aqueducts	  and	  over	  mountains	  in	  the	  1910s.6	  Around	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  city	  of	  San	  Francisco	  battled	  and	  eventually	  defeated	  John	  Muir	  and	  supporters	  within	  his	  Sierra	  Club	  to	  dam	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  in	  Yosemite’s	  scenic	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  Valley,	  creating	  a	  consistent	  supply	  of	  water	  for	  San	  Franciscans	  so	  fresh	  it	  surpassed	  EPA	  drinking	  standards	  and	  flowed	  to	  the	  city	  through	  a	  system	  that	  relied	  solely	  on	  gravity.7	  The	  legacy	  of	  these	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projects,	  particularly	  the	  specter	  of	  the	  parched	  Owens	  River	  Valley,	  continue	  to	  reverberate	  in	  disputes	  over	  water	  and	  have	  left	  many	  skeptical	  about	  additional	  reallocations	  of	  water	  across	  the	  state.	  	  Contemporary	  California	  water	  transfers	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  severe	  drought	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  California	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy	  proposed	  water	  markets	  as	  a	  means	  of	  managing	  its	  water	  crisis.	  Both	  the	  governor	  and	  the	  legislature	  strongly	  endorsed	  water	  marketing,	  and	  changes	  were	  made	  to	  the	  
California	  Water	  Code	  to	  better	  facilitate	  water	  transfers.8	  This	  coincided	  with	  a	  broader	  movement	  nationwide	  to	  see	  greater	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  the	  natural	  environment.	  Another	  drought	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  an	  ecological	  crisis	  in	  the	  Sacramento-­‐San	  Joaquin	  Delta	  sparked	  an	  increase	  in	  water	  transfers	  to	  help	  restore	  instream	  flows,	  primarily	  through	  purchases	  by	  government	  agencies.	  	  Still,	  the	  amount	  of	  activity	  within	  California’s	  water	  market	  is	  far	  less	  than	  many	  had	  predicted,	  particularly	  when	  looking	  at	  long-­‐term	  transactions.	  The	  University	  of	  
California	  at	  Santa	  Barbara,	  through	  the	  Bren	  School	  of	  Environmental	  Science	  and	  Management,	  compiled	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  all	  water	  transfers	  in	  the	  12	  Western	  
Figure	  2:	  Screenshot	  of	  Water	  Transfer	  Level	  Dataset	  maintained	  by	  UCSB	  (Source:	  UCSB	  2010)	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states	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  Created	  as	  a	  public	  service	  and	  available	  at	  the	  school’s	  website,9	  the	  spreadsheet	  allows	  researchers	  to	  compare	  transfers	  based	  on	  price,	  volume,	  type	  of	  transaction,	  duration,	  and	  other	  relevant	  categories	  (when	  available).	  Notable	  California	  transfers	  listed	  in	  this	  table	  include	  a	  2001	  purchase	  by	  the	  Metropolitan	  Water	  District	  of	  Southern	  California	  from	  the	  Palo	  Verde	  Irrigation	  District,	  a	  series	  of	  sales	  from	  Poseidon	  Resources	  Corporation	  to	  local	  water	  districts,	  and	  the	  1997	  transfer	  from	  the	  Imperial	  Irrigation	  District	  to	  the	  San	  Diego	  County	  Water	  Authority	  worth	  nearly	  $2	  billion	  total.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  comparison	  to	  the	  case	  profiled	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  water	  transfer	  database	  was	  first	  filtered	  to	  only	  California	  transactions.	  From	  1987	  to	  2010,	  the	  spreadsheet	  had	  data	  for	  nearly	  700	  transactions.	  The	  transfers	  were	  then	  sorted	  according	  to	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  contracted	  agreement,	  so	  that	  the	  longest	  leases	  showed	  first.	  According	  to	  the	  database,	  46	  transfers	  took	  place	  with	  a	  duration	  of	  10	  years	  or	  more,	  and	  only	  3	  had	  durations	  of	  50	  years	  or	  more	  (though	  hundreds	  of	  transfers	  did	  not	  have	  a	  recorded	  duration).	  (See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  table	  of	  transfers	  sorted	  by	  duration).	  This	  shows	  just	  how	  exceptional	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer,	  with	  a	  contract	  length	  of	  50	  years,	  would	  have	  been.	  	  Transfers	  could	  also	  be	  arranged	  by	  size	  of	  the	  transfer,	  measured	  in	  annual	  acre-­‐feet	  of	  water	  (see	  Appendix	  B).	  Looking	  at	  all	  692	  recorded	  California	  water	  transfers,	  512	  reported	  a	  volume	  of	  committed	  annual	  acre-­‐feetI	  greater	  than	  the	  2,240	  af	  (or	  2	  mgd	  for	  a	  year)	  amount	  proposed	  in	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer.	  This	  would	  have	  placed	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  I	  Committed	  annual	  acre-­‐feet,	  according	  to	  the	  UCSB	  database,	  was	  a	  measurement	  developed	  to	  show	  that	  long-­‐term	  leases	  transfer	  greater	  volumes	  of	  water	  than	  one-­‐year	  transfers.	  This	  variable	  discounts	  the	  flow	  of	  water	  over	  time	  into	  the	  year	  the	  water	  was	  first	  transferred.	  For	  more	  information,	  please	  visit	  http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm	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transfer	  in	  the	  26th	  percentile—showing	  it	  to	  be	  relatively	  small	  in	  volume.	  For	  comparison,	  the	  larger	  25,000	  af	  transfer,	  which	  the	  SFPUC	  was	  considering	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  would	  have	  been	  in	  the	  67th	  percentile	  (232	  out	  of	  the	  692	  reported	  volumes	  larger	  than	  25,000	  af).	  The	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer	  would	  have	  been	  considered	  an	  agricultural-­‐to-­‐urban	  transfer.	  Looking	  again	  at	  the	  database,	  there	  are	  115	  recorded	  agricultural-­‐to-­‐urban	  transfers	  in	  California	  thus	  far,	  representing	  about	  17%	  of	  the	  total.	  This	  is	  the	  third-­‐most	  common	  transfer	  typology,	  behind	  agricultural-­‐to-­‐agricultural	  and	  urban-­‐to-­‐urban	  (though	  more	  common	  than	  other	  types	  such	  as	  agricultural-­‐to-­‐environmental	  and	  urban-­‐to-­‐environmental).	  
	   	  The	  allure	  of	  water	  markets	  and	  transfers	  	   The	  theory	  of	  developing	  markets	  for	  water	  transfers	  evolved	  through	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  spreading	  from	  academia	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  water	  management.10	  Though	  there	  had	  long	  been	  short-­‐term	  transfers	  and	  temporary	  rentals,	  only	  in	  recent	  decades	  have	  large-­‐scale	  transfers	  gained	  popularity	  among	  water	  managers.	  Some	  environmentalists	  have	  joined	  a	  chorus	  of	  economists	  in	  advocating	  water	  markets	  as	  a	  sound	  solution	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  demand	  for	  fresh	  water	  appears	  to	  overwhelm	  the	  supply.	  Proponents	  of	  water	  markets,	  in	  which	  water	  rights	  are	  treated	  as	  a	  tradable	  good,	  believe	  they	  can	  address	  both	  economic	  inefficiencies	  and	  the	  wasteful	  use	  of	  water.11	  	  
Figure	  3:	  How	  the	  initial	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer	  would	  have	  compared	  to	  existing	  CA	  transfers	  
Duration Volume Type
Proposed3SFPUC8MID3transfer 503years 2,2403af Ag8Urban
Compared)to)existing)CA)transfers 99th)percentile 26th)percentile 3rd)most)common
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Advocates	  of	  water	  transfers	  within	  a	  water	  market	  claim	  many	  benefits,	  including:	  	  -­‐ they	  allow	  the	  user	  to	  be	  properly	  reimbursed	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  water	  they	  consent	  to	  trade	  -­‐ they	  can	  improve	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  farmers	  -­‐ they	  create	  incentives	  for	  all	  users	  to	  save	  water	  because	  of	  the	  higher	  cost	  of	  water	  -­‐ they	  allow	  water	  to	  be	  used	  for	  a	  higher-­‐value	  purpose	  and	  thus	  potentially	  generate	  more	  overall	  revenue	  -­‐ they	  better	  protect	  traditional	  water	  rights	  than	  volumetric	  pricing	  -­‐ they	  encourage	  private	  financing	  of	  water	  infrastructure	  and	  reduce	  the	  public	  subsidization	  of	  capital	  and	  operating	  expenses	  -­‐ they	  provide	  maximum	  flexibility	  when	  demand	  dramatically	  shifts	  across	  sectors	  and	  geographic	  regions12	  	  Markets	  for	  water	  transfers	  have	  emerged	  in	  various	  corners	  of	  the	  world,	  from	  Chile	  to	  Australia.13	  In	  California,	  water	  transfers	  hold	  particular	  allure	  for	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  see	  water	  shifted	  from	  an	  agricultural	  sector	  consuming	  over	  half	  the	  state’s	  water	  to	  urban	  centers	  with	  burgeoning	  populations,	  and	  for	  those	  willing	  to	  sell	  valuable	  water	  to	  environmental	  groups	  seeking	  to	  restore	  aquatic	  ecosystems.14	  	  	  Resistance	  to	  water	  transfers	  	   Water	  transfers	  do	  not	  escape	  scrutiny	  or	  even	  outright	  opposition.	  Some	  question	  the	  very	  applicability	  of	  developing	  an	  economic	  market	  for	  transfers	  of	  water	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  owing	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  handling	  water	  as	  either	  a	  strict	  private	  commodity	  or	  a	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pure	  public	  good.15	  An	  overview	  of	  the	  possible	  arguments	  against	  transfers	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  in	  California	  includes:	  
• Economic	  concerns:	  
o steep	  increases	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  water	  for	  the	  users	  of	  the	  purchasing	  agency	  
o fallowed	  farm	  lands	  which	  result	  in	  declines	  in	  production	  and	  job	  loss	  
o indirect	  impacts	  on	  rural	  economy	  due	  to	  fallowed	  fields	  
• Environmental	  impacts:	  
o ecological	  impacts	  resulting	  from	  stream	  flow	  changes	  and	  possible	  deterioration	  in	  water	  quality	  
o hydrological	  changes	  across	  entire	  water	  basin	  
o excessive	  groundwater	  pumping	  to	  offset	  surface	  water	  reductions	  
• Equity	  issues:	  
o wealthier	  communities	  purchasing	  water	  rights	  may	  not	  face	  the	  same	  conservation	  restraints	  as	  less	  wealthy	  communities	  selling	  water	  
o drought	  years	  causing	  particular	  hardship	  for	  a	  community	  already	  committed	  to	  selling	  water	  by	  contract	  
o concern	  that	  a	  transfer,	  if	  only	  for	  a	  limited	  time	  or	  a	  single	  transaction,	  would	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  “beneficial	  use”	  and	  forfeit	  a	  claimant’s	  future	  water	  rights	  
o difficulty	  in	  reclaiming	  water	  rights	  by	  original	  holders	  after	  they	  have	  been	  traded,	  even	  if	  only	  on	  a	  temporary	  basis16	  Some	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  concerns	  are	  known	  as	  “third-­‐party”	  impacts,	  because	  they	  affect	  an	  entity	  or	  individuals	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  participating	  in	  the	  water	  transfer	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(i.e.	  neither	  the	  buyer	  nor	  seller).	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  these	  impacts	  to	  be	  both	  positive	  and	  negative,	  though	  negative	  third-­‐party	  impacts	  are	  more	  commonly	  brought	  up	  in	  water	  transfer	  discussions.	  At	  times,	  third	  parties	  are	  brought	  into	  negotiations,	  and	  they	  can	  be	  compensated	  for	  a	  perceived	  loss.	  The	  environment	  itself	  has	  been	  deemed	  a	  third	  party	  and	  is	  entitled	  to	  certain	  protections,	  particularly	  in	  California,	  from	  harm	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  transfers.17	  	  The	  very	  existence	  of	  potential	  third-­‐party	  impacts	  can	  create	  high	  uncertainty	  during	  the	  negotiations,	  driving	  up	  transaction	  costs	  or	  scuttling	  a	  deal	  outright.	  Literature	  and	  prior	  cases	  suggest	  that	  concerns	  regarding	  third	  parties	  are	  a	  considerable	  obstacle	  for	  water	  transfers	  in.181920	  One	  objective	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  relative	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  predicted	  third-­‐party	  impacts—and	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  them—played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  eventual	  termination	  of	  the	  San	  Francisco-­‐Modesto	  water	  deal.	  Third-­‐party	  impacts	  will	  be	  assessed	  alongside	  other	  factors	  that	  arose	  in	  this	  scenario,	  such	  as	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  water	  deliveries	  in	  dry	  years	  and	  complications	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  contractual	  obligations.	  	  
Conceptual	  Framework	  The	  proposed	  water	  transfer	  between	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  (SFPUC)	  and	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  (MID)	  was	  selected	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  several	  reasons.	  It	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  San	  Francisco	  would	  diversify	  its	  water	  supply	  through	  a	  substantial	  water	  transfer.	  The	  exceptional	  length	  of	  the	  contract,	  as	  previously	  indicated,	  would	  make	  it	  one	  of	  the	  longest	  transfers	  in	  California	  history.	  As	  an	  agricultural-­‐to-­‐urban	  transfer	  in	  the	  north	  part	  of	  the	  state,	  it	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  open	  the	  floodgates	  for	  a	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deluge	  of	  similar	  transfers,	  which	  water	  experts	  had	  anticipated	  for	  years.	  This	  case	  was	  particularly	  intriguing	  because	  it	  occurred	  so	  recently,	  with	  the	  plan	  terminated	  in	  September	  2012,	  providing	  the	  possibility	  of	  ample	  data	  collection.	  	  Though	  the	  case	  in	  question	  involved	  agencies	  within	  100	  miles	  of	  each	  other,	  the	  stakeholders	  acted	  within	  a	  much	  larger	  water	  network	  in	  the	  West.	  Communities	  in	  the	  Western	  United	  States	  (and	  Mexico)	  share	  not	  only	  long	  rivers,	  vast	  infrastructure,	  and	  overdrawn	  aquifers,	  but	  also	  the	  pressures	  of	  a	  changing	  climate	  that	  brings	  with	  it	  increased	  drought	  and	  decreased	  reliability.	  San	  Francisco	  observed	  metropolitan	  areas	  to	  the	  north	  and	  south	  pursuing	  costly	  desalination	  projects	  to	  secure	  their	  water	  supplies,	  while	  Modesto	  saw	  neighboring	  farmers	  in	  the	  Central	  Valley	  fallowing	  lands	  after	  cutbacks	  in	  their	  water	  deliveries.	  The	  climate	  therefore	  created	  an	  important	  context	  for	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  negotiations.	  Although	  Northern	  California	  was	  not	  in	  a	  drought	  when	  negotiations	  formally	  began	  in	  mid-­‐2011,	  dry	  conditions	  began	  to	  emerge	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  and	  by	  March	  2012,	  much	  of	  the	  state	  was	  experiencing	  “severe	  drought”	  according	  to	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Drought	  Monitor	  data.21	  Stakeholders	  representing	  diverse	  interests	  all	  understood	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  reliable	  water	  supply;	  securing	  additional	  water	  for	  drought	  protection	  was	  the	  reason	  the	  SFPUC	  pursued	  this	  transfer	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  uncertainty	  regarding	  water	  in	  dry	  years	  also	  galvanized	  the	  opposition,	  which	  sought	  to	  protect	  against	  the	  risks	  that	  might	  come	  with	  a	  prolonged	  drought.	  How	  water	  deliveries	  would	  be	  handled	  during	  dry	  years	  would	  be	  an	  important	  element	  of	  this	  case.	  	  This	  case	  is	  also	  valuable	  to	  study	  because	  it	  has	  important	  lessons	  to	  be	  extrapolated	  for	  future	  water	  management	  decisions.	  (Indeed,	  as	  of	  early	  2013,	  the	  SFPUC	  continues	  to	  explore	  other	  possible	  water	  transfers.)	  The	  generalizability	  of	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	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case	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  proposal	  involved	  the	  two	  most	  anticipated	  participants	  in	  a	  water	  transfer:	  an	  urban	  area	  (typically	  large	  and	  wealthy)	  purchasing	  from	  a	  rural	  district	  (often	  facing	  financial	  hardship).	  The	  case	  involved	  a	  typical	  third	  party,	  the	  environment,	  due	  to	  the	  fragile	  ecosystem	  of	  the	  Tuolumne	  River.	  It	  would	  occur	  in	  a	  region	  where	  there	  is	  access	  to	  groundwater,	  susceptible	  to	  increased	  pumping	  to	  offset	  transferred	  surface	  water.	  The	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  has	  a	  strong	  agricultural	  base,	  which	  could	  feel	  its	  economic	  activity	  threatened	  by	  a	  perceived	  reduction	  in	  water	  supply	  or	  reliability.	  In	  addition,	  this	  transfer	  was	  geographically	  situated	  among	  many	  different	  water	  users	  who	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  transfer’s	  success	  or	  failure.	  	  As	  this	  thesis	  reveals,	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  water	  transfer	  proposal	  went	  from	  a	  potentially	  groundbreaking	  transaction	  to	  a	  failed	  water	  deal.	  Acting	  out	  of	  an	  institutional	  structure	  that	  simultaneously	  created	  constraints	  for	  water	  transfers	  and	  attempts	  to	  facilitate	  them,	  the	  negotiating	  agencies	  found	  themselves	  contending	  with	  variety	  of	  interest	  groups.	  As	  Islam	  and	  Susskind	  write,	  “The	  complexity	  of	  water	  resource	  management	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  great	  many	  stakeholders	  with	  competing	  needs	  who	  interact	  on	  multiple	  levels	  and	  scales	  simultaneously.”22	  Stakeholders	  in	  this	  case	  ranged	  from	  Central	  Valley	  farmers	  to	  residents	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  to	  environmental	  organizations	  to	  Tea	  Party	  activists	  to	  Bay	  Area	  water	  retailers.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  this	  deal’s	  dysfunction	  lay	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  stakeholders,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  prism	  through	  which	  the	  negotiation	  has	  been	  analyzed.	  The	  conflicts	  could	  be	  categorized	  as	  those	  internal	  to	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  those	  connecting	  the	  MID	  to	  its	  previously	  contracted	  partner	  (city	  of	  Modesto)	  and	  pending	  partner	  (SFPUC),	  and	  those	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  concerned	  third-­‐party	  interests.	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  three	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spheres	  of	  conflict	  provides	  a	  framework	  to	  understand	  how	  this	  transfer	  arrangement	  eventually	  fell	  apart.	  	  
Research	  Questions	  and	  Methods	  	   Using	  the	  proposed	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission-­‐Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  transfer	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  the	  following	  questions:	  What	  were	  the	  different	  factors,	  and	  their	  magnitude	  of	  impact,	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  termination	  of	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  water	  transfer?	  Were	  there	  concerns	  about	  third-­‐party	  impacts,	  as	  are	  commonly	  experienced	  in	  water	  transfers,	  that	  disrupted	  this	  particular	  deal?	  Was	  this	  deal	  complicated	  by	  factors	  aside	  from	  third-­‐party	  impacts?	  Do	  the	  explanations	  by	  various	  parties	  for	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  proposed	  water	  transfer	  differ?	  Based	  upon	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  but	  before	  a	  collection,	  synthesis,	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  data	  for	  this	  particular	  case,	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  could	  be	  conjectured.	  Knowing	  this	  was	  a	  controversial	  water	  transaction	  that	  encountered	  strong	  opposition,	  I	  anticipated	  that	  explanations	  for	  the	  collapse	  would	  vary	  significantly.	  The	  literature	  suggested	  that	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  the	  breakdown	  of	  negotiations	  would	  be	  perceived	  third-­‐party	  impacts.232425	  Specifically,	  reductions	  in	  surface	  water	  delivery	  could	  lead	  to	  disruption	  of	  the	  agricultural	  economy,	  groundwater	  overdraft—already	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  region—and	  environmental	  harm	  to	  the	  river.	  Beyond	  common	  third-­‐party	  impacts,	  one	  could	  speculate	  on	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  environmental	  regulation	  and	  cutbacks	  to	  deliveries	  of	  water	  to	  farmers	  in	  California’s	  Central	  Valley	  as	  also	  playing	  influential	  roles.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  my	  questions,	  I	  first	  investigated	  the	  institutional	  framework	  created	  within	  California	  that	  facilitates	  and	  oversees	  water	  transfers.	  This	  begins	  at	  the	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federal	  level	  and	  works	  all	  the	  way	  down	  to	  the	  regional	  water	  districts.	  I	  assessed	  the	  background	  policies	  and	  documents,	  such	  as	  the	  California	  Water	  Code,	  that	  impacted	  the	  two	  negotiating	  parties.	  I	  also	  inspected	  the	  various	  documents	  created	  through	  the	  proposal,	  including	  different	  drafts	  of	  the	  actual	  contract,	  to	  incorporate	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Because	  this	  deal	  was	  terminated	  in	  September	  of	  2012,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  trace	  the	  course	  of	  events	  through	  close	  media	  coverage	  archived	  online,	  in	  addition	  to	  collecting	  outreach	  material	  generated	  by	  various	  organizations	  closely	  following	  the	  transfer.	  To	  dig	  deeper	  into	  the	  factors	  behind	  the	  water	  transfer	  deal’s	  collapse,	  I	  arranged	  interviews	  with	  individuals	  connected	  to	  the	  proposal.	  I	  sought	  at	  least	  one	  person	  from	  each	  relevant	  party,	  including	  the	  SFPUC,	  the	  MID,	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  the	  agricultural	  community,	  and	  environmental	  groups.	  Interview	  subjects	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  their	  roles	  in	  the	  actual	  negotiations,	  their	  positions	  within	  their	  organization,	  and/or	  existing	  quotes	  in	  the	  media	  that	  established	  their	  familiarity	  with	  the	  deal.	  In	  some	  cases,	  additional	  interviewees	  were	  selected	  based	  on	  snowballing	  techniques,	  as	  individuals	  would	  be	  recommended	  as	  useful	  sources	  of	  information.	  	  Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  each	  of	  the	  subjects,	  in	  person	  whenever	  feasible	  and	  on	  the	  phone	  when	  necessary.	  Interviewees	  were	  asked	  specific	  questions	  based	  on	  their	  particular	  role,	  but	  every	  interviewee	  was	  asked	  to	  attempt	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  transfer’s	  collapse	  and	  to	  name	  important	  factors.	  These	  revealed	  reasons	  were	  assembled	  and	  coded	  (see	  Appendix	  C).	  They	  were	  then	  synthesized	  with	  other	  data	  collected.	  Through	  analysis	  of	  the	  data,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  questions.	  Using	  the	  explanations	  provided	  and	  the	  primary	  source	  documents,	  I	  also	  developed	  the	  most	  likely	  
	  	   22	  
explanation	  for	  the	  transfer	  deal’s	  collapse.	  This	  theory	  was	  presented	  in	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  conflict	  points	  that	  persisted	  among	  the	  many	  stakeholders.	  I	  then	  assessed	  the	  present	  state	  of	  the	  two	  parties	  engaged	  in	  the	  negotiation	  and	  where	  they	  are	  heading	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  The	  thesis	  concludes	  with	  key	  takeaways	  that	  should	  be	  applied	  not	  only	  by	  the	  agencies	  involved	  in	  the	  proposed	  transfer,	  but	  others	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  complex	  water	  management	  issues.	  	  My	  findings	  are	  summarized,	  and	  suggestions	  for	  possible	  future	  lines	  of	  research	  are	  provided.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  INSTITUTIONAL	  FRAMEWORK	  	  	   Water	  transfers	  occur	  within	  a	  context	  of	  policies,	  laws,	  and	  regulations	  that	  various	  government	  agencies	  have	  established	  and	  facilitate.	  Institutional	  actors	  have	  at	  times	  made	  specific	  decisions	  to	  deliberately	  shape	  California’s	  water	  market	  (such	  as	  the	  1978	  Governor’s	  Commission	  to	  Review	  California’s	  Water	  Rights	  Law),	  while	  at	  other	  times	  extensive	  policies	  based	  on	  other	  concerns	  have	  tangentially	  impacted	  water	  transfers	  (such	  as	  the	  Endangered	  Species	  Act).	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  begin	  dissecting	  the	  institutional	  framework	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  (as	  it	  pertains	  to	  water	  transfers)	  and	  scale	  down	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  local	  agencies	  and	  organizations	  involved	  in	  the	  analyzed	  transfer.	  Important	  government	  agencies	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  influence,	  or	  take	  part	  in,	  transfers	  will	  be	  introduced.	  Influential	  legislation	  at	  the	  state	  and	  federal	  level	  will	  be	  highlighted,	  alongside	  policies	  enacted	  to	  promote	  water	  markets.	  Elements	  with	  a	  direct	  bearing	  on	  the	  case	  under	  scrutiny	  will	  be	  presented,	  such	  as	  the	  re-­‐licensing	  of	  dams	  or	  court	  cases	  establishing	  precedent.	  Fundamental	  to	  any	  discussion	  of	  water	  institutions	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  water	  law,	  presented	  through	  California’s	  unique	  blend	  of	  riparian	  and	  prior	  appropriation	  water	  rights,	  relevant	  sections	  of	  the	  California	  Water	  Code,	  and	  definitions	  within	  the	  state	  constitution.	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  with	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  proposed	  transfer,	  starting	  with	  the	  two	  negotiating	  agencies	  and	  concluding	  with	  interested	  third	  parties.	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Federal	  Government	  In	  California,	  federal	  agencies	  have	  historically	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  water	  management,	  though	  this	  role	  is	  shifting.	  Decades	  ago,	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation	  and	  U.S.	  Army	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	  constructed	  dams,	  aqueducts,	  and	  other	  infrastructure	  that	  proved	  crucial	  in	  facilitating	  the	  transfer	  of	  large	  volumes	  of	  water	  across	  vast	  distances	  in	  California.	  Now	  these	  agencies	  continue	  to	  participate	  in	  water	  reallocation,	  although	  less	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  more	  through	  oversight	  and	  management.	  The	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation	  must	  review	  all	  water	  transfers	  that	  would	  utilize	  their	  infrastructure.	  Additionally,	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation	  and	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  Fish	  and	  Wildlife	  Service	  will	  occasionally	  purchase	  or	  lease	  water	  directly	  with	  the	  express	  purpose	  of	  restoring	  natural	  habitats	  for	  riparian	  species.26	  	  The	  1970s	  brought	  attention	  to	  a	  host	  of	  environmental	  crises,	  resulting	  in	  the	  passage	  of	  federal	  (and	  state)	  acts	  that	  gave	  activists	  strong	  legal	  tools	  with	  which	  to	  protect	  natural	  resources	  and	  habitats.	  Much	  of	  this	  legislation	  impacts	  water	  transfers.	  The	  federal	  Endangered	  Species	  Act	  can	  restrict	  transfers	  in	  river	  basins	  with	  vulnerable	  species;	  the	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act	  requires	  an	  environmental	  impact	  statement	  in	  the	  case	  of	  significant	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  from	  a	  federal	  project;	  and	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  protects	  water	  quality,	  which	  is	  often	  affected	  by	  water	  transfers.27	  Specifically,	  Section	  404	  of	  the	  Clean	  Water	  Act	  is	  used	  to	  protect	  wetlands,	  and	  could	  be	  used	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  as	  a	  means	  to	  regulate	  the	  many	  water	  transfers	  that	  would	  impact	  wetlands	  (though	  thus	  far	  it	  has	  elected	  not	  to	  do	  so).28	  	  The	  1913	  Raker	  Act	  permanently	  altered	  California’s	  physical	  landscape	  in	  addition	  to	  water	  and	  power	  dynamics.	  San	  Francisco	  had	  been	  trying	  for	  years	  to	  dam	  the	  Hetch	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Hetchy	  Valley	  within	  Yosemite	  in	  order	  to	  both	  create	  a	  vast	  reservoir	  for	  storing	  high	  quality	  drinking	  water	  and	  to	  develop	  a	  source	  of	  hydroelectric	  power.	  After	  failing	  several	  times	  to	  overcome	  opposition	  spearheaded	  by	  John	  Muir	  and	  supporters	  within	  his	  Sierra	  Club,	  in	  1913	  U.S.	  Representative	  John	  Raker	  of	  California	  introduced	  legislation	  during	  a	  hasty	  summer	  session	  of	  Congress	  to	  execute	  the	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  Reservoir	  and	  succeeded	  in	  its	  passage.29	  The	  so-­‐called	  Raker	  Act	  gave	  San	  Francisco	  the	  water	  rights	  (as	  well	  as	  rights	  to	  the	  hydroelectric	  power)	  created	  by	  the	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  Reservoir,	  provided	  it	  did	  not	  sell	  them	  for	  profit	  (Raker	  Act	  1913).30	  This	  reservoir	  in	  the	  Sierras	  grants	  San	  Francisco	  pre-­‐1914	  water	  rights	  on	  the	  Upper	  Tuolumne	  River,	  which	  it	  diverts	  through	  a	  complicated	  pipe	  system	  to	  deliver	  to	  Bay	  Area	  users.	  The	  act	  specifically	  impacts	  water	  transfers,	  including	  the	  proposed	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer.	  It	  specifies	  particular	  conditions	  under	  which	  San	  Francisco	  can	  divert	  additional	  water	  at	  the	  reservoir,	  and	  it	  limits	  the	  amount	  of	  acreage	  the	  MID	  can	  serve	  through	  its	  entitled	  water	  rights.31	  	   An	  element	  at	  the	  national	  level	  that	  impacts	  water	  use	  in	  California,	  and	  which	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer,	  is	  the	  re-­‐licensing	  of	  dams.	  Any	  dam	  that	  produces	  hydroelectric	  power	  is	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (FERC).	  Dams	  are	  operated	  under	  long-­‐term	  licenses	  that	  eventually	  must	  be	  renewed,	  and	  when	  this	  renewal	  occurs	  it	  is	  an	  opportunity	  for	  FERC	  to	  consider	  the	  viability	  of	  committing	  a	  certain	  portion	  of	  the	  public’s	  river	  resources	  to	  generating	  power.	  Under	  the	  Federal	  Power	  Act,	  FERC	  must	  balance	  additional	  considerations	  beyond	  power	  generation,	  including	  protection	  of	  fish	  and	  wildlife	  and	  other	  environmental	  quality	  aspects.32	  During	  the	  re-­‐licensing	  process,	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many	  parties	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  license	  and	  propose	  possible	  alternatives.	  	  In	  California,	  the	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir,	  created	  along	  the	  Lower	  Tuolumne	  River	  that	  supplies	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  will	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐licensed	  by	  2016.	  Many	  predict	  that,	  due	  to	  ecological	  considerations,	  the	  dam	  might	  be	  required	  to	  release	  additional	  amounts	  of	  water	  into	  the	  Tuolumne,	  thus	  reducing	  its	  storage	  capacity	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  water	  that	  can	  be	  delivered	  to	  MID	  customers.33	  Though	  this	  is	  not	  a	  foregone	  conclusion,	  many	  feel	  that	  to	  preserve	  its	  claim	  to	  as	  much	  water	  as	  possible	  (and	  discourage	  the	  government	  from	  demanding	  increased	  releases	  to	  the	  river),	  the	  MID	  needs	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  need	  for	  its	  entire	  water	  allocation.34	  By	  this	  reasoning,	  a	  water	  deal	  with	  San	  Francisco	  would	  signal	  that	  the	  MID	  has	  excess	  water,	  and	  that	  the	  MID	  would	  therefore	  be	  asked	  to	  give	  up	  more	  water	  in	  the	  FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  of	  the	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir.	  Conversely,	  the	  re-­‐licensing	  process	  will	  cost	  the	  MID	  at	  least	  $30	  million	  whether	  it	  transfers	  the	  water	  or	  not,	  a	  steep	  expense	  that	  proponents	  argue	  could	  be	  paid	  through	  revenue	  raised	  from	  the	  water	  sale.	  	  	  State	  government	  	   The	  determination	  of	  water	  rights	  in	  California	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  institutional	  framework	  for	  water	  in	  the	  state	  and	  its	  subsequent	  impacts.	  Writes	  Wescoat,	  “The	  diffusion	  of	  water	  rights	  institutions	  is	  linked	  with,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  fully	  determined	  by,	  large-­‐scale	  patterns	  of	  land	  and	  water	  development	  and	  their	  associated	  environmental	  and	  social	  impacts.”35	  Categorically,	  groundwater	  and	  surface	  water	  are	  treated	  differently.	  Groundwater	  is	  governed	  by	  common	  law,	  it	  is	  left	  to	  local	  governing	  bodies	  to	  manage,	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and	  it	  requires	  no	  state	  water	  right	  permit	  to	  use.36	  Surface	  water	  is	  far	  more	  regulated,	  and	  a	  more	  defined	  infrastructure	  exists	  for	  managing	  the	  exchange	  of	  surface	  water.	  The	  laws	  and	  policies	  described	  below	  apply	  solely	  to	  surface	  water,	  beginning	  with	  water	  rights.	  	  	  California	  water	  law	  requires	  all	  water	  claimed	  by	  rights	  holders	  be	  put	  to	  “beneficial	  use.”	  In	  the	  past,	  this	  involved	  diverting	  the	  water	  from	  its	  watercourse	  and	  applying	  it	  in	  a	  manner	  such	  as	  irrigation	  or	  industry,	  but	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  come	  to	  include	  uses	  for	  the	  environment	  as	  well.	  Unlike	  most	  states,	  California	  recognizes	  both	  categories	  of	  water	  rights—riparian	  and	  appropriative.	  Riparian	  rights,	  more	  common	  to	  the	  east	  coast,	  apply	  to	  “the	  reasonable	  and	  beneficial	  use”	  of	  water	  on	  land	  adjacent	  to	  a	  watercourse.37	  These	  rights	  have	  historically	  been	  tied	  to	  location,	  and	  have	  had	  their	  uses	  constrained	  through	  recent	  permitting.	  Because	  they	  are	  less	  common	  in	  California,	  are	  poorly	  documented,	  and	  are	  not	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  water	  agency	  controlling	  transfers,	  riparian	  rights	  are	  typically	  not	  exchanged.38	  	  More	  relevant	  to	  water	  transfers	  are	  appropriative	  rights.	  These	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  “first	  in	  time,	  first	  in	  right”	  rule	  that	  provides	  seniority	  to	  those	  who	  claimed	  the	  rights	  first.39	  In	  California,	  the	  1913	  Water	  Commission	  Act	  determined	  a	  specific	  framework	  for	  appropriating	  water	  that	  had	  been	  absent	  until	  that	  point,	  applying	  to	  all	  appropriative	  rights	  made	  after	  1914.40	  Thus,	  appropriative	  rights	  in	  California	  are	  specified	  as	  either	  pre-­‐1914	  or	  post-­‐1914,	  and	  this	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  water	  transfers.	  Post-­‐1914	  water	  rights	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  water	  exchanges	  fall	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  State	  Water	  Resources	  Control	  Board,	  which	  must	  approve	  the	  exchange,	  while	  pre-­‐1914	  transfers	  do	  not.	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A	  key	  component	  of	  water	  law	  common	  among	  Western	  states	  that	  recognize	  prior	  appropriation	  is	  the	  no	  injury	  rule,	  which	  forbids	  any	  change	  in	  the	  way	  water	  is	  used	  that	  would	  impair	  its	  use	  by	  other	  water	  rights	  holders	  (NRC	  1992).41	  This	  doctrine	  was	  established	  through	  case	  law	  in	  California	  as	  early	  as	  1862	  and	  is	  considered	  more	  extensive	  than	  those	  of	  other	  Western	  states,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  protection	  extended	  to	  the	  environment.42	  It	  presents	  the	  greatest	  potential	  to	  protect	  third	  parties	  from	  negative	  consequences	  of	  water	  transfers.	  Additionally,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer	  arrangement,	  a	  previously	  contracted	  party—the	  City	  of	  Modesto—could	  point	  to	  potential	  legal	  injury	  created	  by	  a	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  contract.	  (Which	  it	  in	  fact	  did	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  MID	  threatening	  a	  lawsuit).43	  Such	  a	  legal	  injury	  created	  tremendous	  disruption	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  far	  more	  than	  a	  potentially	  compensable	  injury	  claimed	  by	  an	  affected	  third	  party.	   In	  addition,	  California	  has	  an	  area-­‐of-­‐origin	  protection	  law	  to	  provide	  priority	  to	  an	  area	  exporting	  water	  to	  another	  watershed	  importing	  the	  water,	  and	  reserves	  water	  for	  the	  original	  county	  to	  meet	  all	  future	  development	  needs.44	  Along	  with	  Oregon,	  California	  has	  developed	  water	  salvage	  laws	  to	  encourage	  those	  who	  conserve	  or	  prevent	  the	  loss	  of	  water	  through	  investments,	  awarding	  any	  salvaged	  water	  to	  the	  saver	  instead	  of	  to	  its	  original	  user.	  This	  occurred	  during	  a	  water	  transaction	  in	  Southern	  California,	  and	  may	  have	  come	  into	  play	  had	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  deal	  gone	  through,	  as	  the	  MID	  reportedly	  intended	  to	  use	  money	  from	  the	  sale	  to	  directly	  reinvest	  into	  infrastructure	  and	  reduce	  water	  loss.	  Thus,	  over	  many	  decades	  a	  unique	  water	  tradition	  evolved	  in	  California,	  mixing	  riparian	  and	  appropriative	  rights.	  In	  it,	  “the	  water	  must	  go	  with	  the	  land,”	  as	  George	  Davidson	  claimed	  years	  ago.45	  The	  tradition	  prioritized	  place	  of	  use	  over	  time	  of	  use,	  as	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where	  the	  water	  was	  put	  to	  use	  mattered	  most.	  Scholars	  such	  as	  A.	  Dan	  Tarlock	  point	  to	  a	  recent	  revival	  of	  this	  territorial	  connection	  between	  water	  and	  land,	  particularly	  as	  regions	  face	  growing	  demands	  on	  water	  from	  land	  use	  shifts	  and	  global	  climate	  change.46	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  water-­‐land	  tradition	  was	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  proposal,	  as	  many	  Modestans	  opposed	  the	  transfer	  particularly	  because	  of	  where	  the	  water	  would	  be	  transferred	  and	  used.	  	   Several	  important	  court	  cases	  in	  California	  have	  established	  legal	  precedent	  for	  water	  use	  and	  its	  reallocation	  among	  users.	  Paramount	  among	  these	  is	  the	  National	  
Audubon	  Society	  v.	  Superior	  Court	  of	  Alpine	  County	  decision.	  In	  this	  1983	  case,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  stated	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  applied	  in	  protecting	  the	  recreational	  uses	  and	  the	  ecological	  integrity	  of	  Mono	  Lake	  from	  increased	  diversions	  by	  Los	  Angeles	  through	  acquired	  water	  rights.47	  Earlier	  in	  1978	  an	  important	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  Decision	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  v.	  California	  case	  upheld	  “California’s	  authority	  to	  regulate	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  federal	  project	  to	  ensure	  environmental	  protection	  objectives,”	  signaling	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  state	  and	  federal	  agencies	  in	  managing	  water	  in	  the	  West.48	  The	  California	  Water	  Code	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  influencing	  water	  management	  decisions,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  transfers.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  two	  principal	  guidelines	  for	  water	  transfers	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  Water	  Code	  are	  that	  the	  seller	  must	  possess	  rights	  to	  the	  water,	  and	  the	  water	  must	  be	  actually	  available-­‐-­‐“wet	  water”	  as	  opposed	  to	  “paper	  water.”49	  Such	  “wet	  water”	  comes	  from	  surface	  storage	  and	  excess	  surface	  water—not	  common	  in	  water-­‐constrained	  California—and	  the	  more	  commonly	  exchanged	  conserved	  surface	  water	  and	  groundwater.	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The	  Water	  Code	  is	  continually	  undergoing	  revisions	  and	  amendments,	  at	  times	  to	  deliberately	  facilitate	  a	  market	  for	  water	  exchanges.	  The	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  referenced	  a	  particular	  paragraph	  of	  the	  code	  to	  assure	  its	  customers	  that	  a	  transfer	  of	  water	  did	  not	  mean	  a	  transfer	  of	  rights:	  Section	  1040	  states	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  water	  shall	  not	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  water	  rights,	  nor	  qualify	  as	  evidence	  of	  “unreasonable	  use”	  that	  might	  put	  the	  right	  at	  risk.50	  In	  fact,	  MID	  officials	  believed	  a	  transfer	  to	  urban	  users	  would	  ensure	  protection	  of	  their	  water	  rights,	  according	  to	  Section	  106	  of	  the	  Water	  Code:	  “Domestic	  use	  is	  the	  highest	  use	  of	  water	  in	  the	  state,	  seconded	  by	  irrigation”	  (MID	  March	  2012).51	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  opponents	  of	  the	  transfer	  conscious	  of	  an	  existing	  contract	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  pointed	  to	  Section	  1014,	  which	  stated	  that	  any	  water	  transfer	  should	  not	  cause	  the	  loss	  or	  reduction	  of	  any	  contractual	  right	  to	  use	  that	  water,	  as	  they	  feared	  the	  SFPUC	  deal	  could	  result	  in	  reduced	  water	  deliveries.52	  	  The	  Water	  Code	  also	  allows	  expedited	  review	  of	  short-­‐term	  or	  temporary	  transfers	  of	  post-­‐1914	  appropriative	  rights,	  exempting	  them	  from	  CEQA	  requirements.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Water	  Code,	  the	  California	  Code	  of	  Regulations	  has	  specific	  “Titles”	  which	  pertain	  to	  water	  use	  and	  transfers,	  including	  Title	  14	  (Natural	  Resources)	  and	  Title	  23	  (Waters).	  	  	  The	  California	  Department	  of	  Water	  Resources	  (DWR)	  is	  one	  of	  several	  important	  statewide	  organizations	  involved	  with	  water	  management.	  The	  DWR	  has	  long	  been	  involved	  in	  water	  projects,	  most	  famously	  through	  its	  construction	  and	  management	  of	  the	  massive	  infrastructure	  running	  through	  the	  state	  known	  as	  the	  State	  Water	  Project.	  For	  water	  transfers	  that	  intend	  to	  use	  this	  infrastructure,	  the	  DWR	  must	  review	  the	  application.53	  Fortunately	  for	  the	  SFPUC,	  the	  proposed	  water	  transfer	  with	  the	  MID	  would	  not	  use	  state	  or	  federal	  infrastructure	  but	  its	  own	  existing	  pipe	  network.	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Overseeing	  water	  transfer	  applications	  specifically	  is	  the	  State	  Water	  Resources	  Control	  Board	  (SWRCB),	  which	  administers	  water	  rights,	  laws,	  and	  regulations.	  Typically,	  transfers	  involving	  post-­‐1914	  appropriative	  rights	  water	  require	  SWRCB	  approval,	  in	  which	  a	  public	  hearing	  is	  hosted	  and	  concerns	  are	  expressed.54	  The	  SWRCB	  can	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  proposed	  transfer	  might	  unreasonably	  affect	  a	  local	  economy	  or	  negatively	  impact	  instream	  uses.55	  Other	  organizations	  involved	  in	  water	  transfers	  are	  the	  California	  Department	  of	  Fish	  and	  Game	  and	  the	  relevant	  Regional	  Water	  Quality	  Control	  Board,	  which	  receive	  maps	  and	  preliminary	  information	  from	  an	  applicant	  petitioning	  for	  a	  transfer	  in	  addition	  to	  holding	  meetings	  to	  discuss	  potential	  environmental	  impacts.	  Just	  as	  the	  federal	  government	  enacted	  important	  legislation	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  1970s,	  California	  implemented	  statewide	  regulation	  as	  well.	  The	  California	  Endangered	  Species	  Act	  and	  California	  Environmental	  Quality	  Act	  (CEQA)	  paralleled	  similar	  federal	  acts.	  CEQA	  is	  particularly	  important	  because	  all	  long-­‐term	  water	  transfers	  are	  subject	  to	  its	  requirements,	  which	  can	  include	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  full	  environmental	  impact	  report	  (EIR).56	  The	  SFPUC	  had	  to	  complete	  an	  EIR	  when	  it	  initially	  conceived	  of	  a	  possible	  2,240	  af	  (or	  2	  mgd)	  water	  transfer,	  and	  it	  will	  need	  to	  complete	  a	  separate	  EIR	  should	  it	  ever	  decide	  to	  go	  forward	  with	  a	  25,000	  af	  transfer.	  In	  addition,	  regulation	  helped	  to	  not	  only	  shape	  water	  transfers	  but	  to	  stimulate	  them.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1980s,	  California	  departments	  such	  as	  the	  DWR	  joined	  federal	  agencies	  in	  making	  direct	  purchases	  of	  water	  to	  support	  environmental	  programs,	  which	  helped	  spur	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  California	  water	  market.57	  California	  began	  promoting	  water	  transfers	  directly	  through	  policy.	  In	  response	  to	  a	  severe	  drought	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  governor	  Jerry	  Brown	  convened	  a	  blue	  ribbon	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panel	  known	  as	  the	  1978	  Governor’s	  Commission	  to	  Review	  California’s	  Water	  Rights	  Law.	  It	  recommended	  amendments	  to	  the	  Water	  Code	  to	  promote	  water	  transfers,	  including	  ease	  of	  access	  to	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  water	  rights	  for	  those	  engaging	  in	  transfers.58	  Through	  the	  1992	  Central	  Valley	  Project	  Improvement	  Act,	  prompted	  by	  dwindling	  native	  fish	  populations	  in	  the	  Sacramento-­‐San	  Joaquin	  Delta,	  a	  mechanism	  was	  established	  to	  allow	  the	  Central	  Valley	  Project	  to	  purchase	  additional	  water	  for	  environmental	  purposes,	  on	  top	  of	  mandates	  that	  more	  than	  1	  million	  acre-­‐feet	  of	  water	  be	  returned	  to	  help	  restore	  the	  environment.59	  Thus,	  not	  only	  did	  transfers	  increase	  as	  the	  state	  government	  began	  to	  directly	  purchase	  water	  for	  the	  environment,	  its	  mandated	  cutbacks	  on	  farmers	  dependent	  on	  Central	  Valley	  Project	  water	  led	  them	  to	  pursue	  water	  transfers	  themselves	  as	  a	  means	  of	  making	  up	  for	  the	  diminished	  deliveries.	  Two	  years	  later	  the	  Monterey	  Agreement	  was	  brokered,	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  contractors	  to	  transfer	  water	  among	  themselves	  within	  the	  State	  Water	  Project.	  In	  2000,	  California	  collaborated	  with	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  launch	  a	  program	  of	  water	  purchases	  for	  the	  fragile	  Delta	  ecosystems	  called	  the	  Environmental	  Water	  Account	  that	  preserved	  agricultural	  and	  urban	  water	  supplies.60	  	  A	  more	  indirect	  policy	  that	  has	  increased	  the	  pressure	  for	  municipal	  water	  transfers,	  including	  the	  proposed	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer,	  are	  the	  2001	  Senate	  Bills	  610	  and	  221.	  Nicknamed	  the	  “show	  me”	  water	  bills,	  they	  require	  local	  governments	  to	  demonstrate	  available	  water	  supplies	  before	  allowing	  additional	  development.61	  Certain	  Bay	  Area	  municipalities	  at	  the	  limit	  of	  their	  water	  allocation	  are	  desperately	  seeking	  additional	  water	  supply	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  growth	  and	  have	  explored	  water	  transfers	  as	  an	  option,	  as	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in	  the	  case	  of	  Brisbane.	  This	  helped	  create	  an	  impetus	  for	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer	  negotiations.	  	  County	  and	  municipal	  government	  At	  a	  local	  level,	  counties	  have	  limited	  power	  to	  influence	  water	  transfers.	  The	  most	  common	  policies	  are	  developed	  in	  regards	  to	  groundwater,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  state-­‐level	  regulation.	  They	  are	  known	  as	  groundwater	  protection	  ordinances,	  put	  in	  place	  to	  counteract	  water	  transfers	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  unsustainable	  mining	  of	  groundwater	  in	  place	  of	  surface	  water.62	  Though	  intended	  initially	  to	  restrict	  transfers	  that	  create	  groundwater	  pumping,	  some	  ordinances	  have	  been	  framed	  to	  essentially	  block	  any	  type	  of	  water	  transfer.	  Stanislaus	  County,	  where	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  is	  situated,	  does	  not	  currently	  have	  such	  an	  ordinance,	  though	  it	  is	  currently	  considering	  through	  a	  committee	  a	  proposal	  that	  would	  ban	  both	  groundwater	  and	  surface	  water	  exports.	  Cities	  are	  even	  less	  likely	  to	  develop	  specific	  policies	  or	  rules	  regarding	  water	  transfers.	  However,	  as	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  case	  demonstrates,	  cities	  as	  institutions	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  transfers.	  The	  city	  of	  Modesto	  had	  a	  profound	  influence	  on	  the	  transfer	  negotiations	  due	  to	  potential	  legal	  complications	  with	  a	  preexisting	  contract	  it	  had	  signed	  with	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  for	  treated	  water.	  In	  fact,	  in	  order	  to	  amend	  the	  2005	  Amended	  Restated	  Treatment	  and	  Delivery	  Agreement	  (ARTDA)	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  city	  of	  Modesto	  (and	  thereby	  bypass	  legal	  conflicts),	  the	  changes	  would	  have	  needed	  approval	  from	  the	  Modesto	  City	  Council—representing	  another	  layer	  of	  institutional	  complexity	  (Marsh	  interview	  2012).63	  In	  San	  Francisco,	  other	  city	  agencies	  attempted	  to	  discourage	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  from	  pursuing	  additional	  water	  from	  the	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Tuolumne	  River	  (as	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  would	  have	  done),	  including	  the	  Board	  of	  Supervisors	  and	  the	  Planning	  Commission.64	  These	  discouraging	  words	  did	  not	  carry	  any	  legal	  threat	  and	  could	  not	  prevent	  the	  SFPUC	  from	  eventually	  moving	  ahead	  with	  attempts	  at	  a	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  involving	  Tuolumne	  River	  water.	  	  Special	  water	  districts	  Though	  a	  variety	  of	  agencies,	  regulations,	  and	  policies	  exist	  at	  the	  federal,	  state,	  and	  county	  level,	  water	  in	  California	  is	  not	  managed	  along	  these	  boundaries.	  Instead	  over	  600	  water	  districts	  that	  cross	  county	  and	  even	  city	  lines	  deliver	  water	  to	  urban	  and	  rural	  users,	  residents	  and	  businesses	  alike.	  These	  are	  what	  are	  known	  as	  special	  districts	  in	  California,	  governing	  bodies	  separate	  from	  counties	  or	  municipalities	  that	  deliver	  a	  specific	  service	  to	  a	  local	  area.	  Services	  range	  from	  police	  protection	  to	  waste	  disposal,	  but	  the	  most	  common	  special	  districts	  in	  California	  are	  water	  utility	  districts.65	  In	  fact,	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  (MID)	  and	  the	  neighboring	  Turlock	  Irrigation	  District	  (TID)	  were	  the	  very	  first	  special	  districts	  in	  California,	  founded	  in	  1887	  to	  guarantee	  reliable	  water	  delivery	  to	  farmers	  in	  the	  area	  at	  all	  times	  of	  the	  year.66	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The	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  negotiation	  
STAKEHOLDERS	   INTERESTS	  
INSTITUTIONAL	  
BASIS	  
San	  Francisco	  Public	  
Utilities	  Commission	  
SFPUC	  sought	  to	  acquire	  2,240	  af	  for	  immediate	  
protection	  against	  droughts,	  and	  to	  open	  the	  pathway	  for	  
future	  discussions	  for	  an	  additional	  25,000	  af	  
Raker	  Act;	  Fourth	  
Agreement;	  PEIR;	  
Phased	  WSIP	  
MID	  Management	  staff	  
MID	  management	  saw	  the	  transfer	  as	  a	  means	  to	  pay	  for	  
needed	  infrastructure	  upgrades	  and	  other	  expenditures	  
while	  protecting	  its	  water	  rights	  
Raker	  Act;	  Fourth	  
Agreement;	  PEIR;	  
Water	  Code	  
MID	  Board	  member	  
Larry	  Byrd	  
Byrd	  fundamentally	  opposed	  any	  transfer	  of	  water	  
outside	  the	  region.	  He	  named	  numerous	  issues	  with	  the	  
particular	  proposal	  with	  SFPUC,	  and	  actively	  sought	  to	  
defeat	  it	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  was	  elected	  to	  the	  board	   	  	  
MID	  Board	  member	  Nick	  
Blom	  
Blom	  was	  not	  initially	  opposed	  to	  the	  transfer,	  but	  had	  
concerns	  about	  the	  length	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  contract.	  He	  
eventually	  switched	  to	  opposing	  the	  transfer,	  largely	  
because	  of	  SFPUC's	  refusal	  to	  negotiate	  on	  first	  right	  of	  
refusal	   	  	  
Modesto	  Residents	  in	  
favor	  
Modestans	  supporting	  the	  transfer	  did	  not	  feel	  that	  the	  
relatively	  small	  initial	  amount	  threatened	  their	  water	  
supply,	  and	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  water	  rates	  go	  up	  or	  
bonds	  floated	  to	  fund	  needed	  infrastructure	  upgrades	   	  	  
Modesto	  Residents	  
against	  
Many	  Modestans	  vocalized	  their	  opposition	  for	  a	  variety	  
of	  reasons,	  which	  included	  a	  fear	  of	  losing	  water	  rights,	  a	  
lack	  of	  trust	  in	  MID,	  and	  concerns	  about	  having	  to	  make	  
cutbacks	  in	  dry	  years,	  all	  of	  which	  galvanized	  them	  to	  
attend	  MID	  public	  hearings	  and	  pen	  letters	  to	  the	  Bee	   	  	  
City	  of	  Modesto	  leaders	  
(Mayor	  &	  City	  Council)	  
The	  City	  of	  Modesto	  formulated	  a	  possible	  legal	  case	  
against	  the	  proposal	  because	  it	  could	  violate	  specific	  
language	  in	  a	  2005	  contract	  with	  MID	  and	  might	  
jeopardize	  the	  ability	  of	  MID	  to	  deliver	  water	  to	  Modesto	  
in	  dry	  years	  
Lawsuit	  based	  on	  
2005	  ARTDA,	  
violation	  of	  
Section	  1014	  of	  
Water	  Code	  
Bay	  Area	  Water	  Supply	  
&	  Conservation	  Agency	  
BAWSCA	  was	  interested	  in	  seeing	  the	  transfer	  go	  through	  
because	  they	  depended	  on	  the	  SFPUC	  for	  much	  of	  their	  





Farmers	  mostly	  opposed	  the	  transfer	  because	  they	  feared	  
sending	  the	  message	  to	  state	  regulators	  that	  there	  was	  
"excess"	  water	  in	  the	  district,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  legacy	  
of	  using	  water	  locally	  for	  agriculture.	  They	  felt	  if	  any	  
water	  could	  be	  transferred,	  it	  should	  go	  to	  neighboring	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Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  
Bureau	  
The	  Bureau	  did	  not	  take	  an	  initial	  position,	  but	  eventually	  
came	  out	  officially	  opposed.	  It	  had	  concerns	  about	  
groundwater	  pumping	  to	  offset	  water	  cutbacks,	  FERC	  re-­‐
licensing	  that	  could	  require	  additional	  diversions,	  and	  







As	  its	  name	  suggests,	  this	  Public	  Action	  Committee	  was	  
founded	  to	  block	  the	  water	  transfer	  in	  large	  part	  because	  
of	  its	  mistrust	  of	  MID	  management.	  It	  felt	  the	  estimates	  
for	  infrastructure	  improvements	  were	  overblown	  while	  
MID	  projections	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  available	  water	  to	  









This	  group	  had	  a	  fundamental	  belief	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  
water	  in	  the	  local	  economy	  and	  culture	  that	  the	  water	  
transfer	  would	  threaten.	  It	  also	  had	  concerns	  with	  MID's	  
management	  approach	  and	  doubted	  its	  economic	  models	  
for	  the	  transfer	  
Lawsuit	  based	  on	  
city's	  obligation	  to	  
provide	  water	  to	  
its	  citizens	  
Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  
This	  environmental	  organization	  already	  felt	  the	  ecology	  
of	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  was	  endangered,	  and	  it	  opposed	  
any	  actions	  which	  would	  take	  additional	  water	  out	  of	  the	  
river.	  It	  also	  believed	  the	  deal	  would	  make	  poor	  economic	  
sense	  for	  the	  City	  of	  San	  Francisco,	  and	  that	  options	  such	  
as	  conservation	  and	  efficiency	  would	  be	  better	  for	  the	  





of	  impact	  on	  36-­‐
mile	  stretch	  of	  
Tuolumne;	  FERC	  
re-­‐licensing	  
Modesto	  Bee	  newspaper	  
Originally	  the	  Bee	  favored	  proceeding	  with	  the	  initial	  
2,240	  af	  transfer,	  but	  when	  the	  City	  of	  Modesto	  
threatened	  legal	  action	  against	  MID,	  its	  main	  priority	  
became	  seeing	  the	  two	  public	  entities	  refrain	  from	  any	  
lawsuits.	  It	  advised	  MID	  to	  form	  an	  advisory	  committee	  
(which	  it	  did)	  to	  consider	  its	  options.	   	  	  
Figure	  4:	  A	  Table	  breaking	  down	  the	  various	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  deal	  	  The	  negotiating	  agencies	  
The	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  serves	  agricultural	  land	  surrounding	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  as	  well	  as	  urban	  customers	  in	  Modesto.	  The	  district	  lies	  between	  the	  Tuolumne	  and	  Stanislaus	  Rivers,	  100	  miles	  east	  of	  San	  Francisco	  (Figure	  5).	  The	  MID	  has	  a	  management	  team	  and	  staff	  that	  pursue	  infrastructure	  improvements	  and	  financing,	  and	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major	  projects	  like	  a	  water	  transfer	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  five-­‐person	  board.	  Board	  members	  represent	  distinct	  geographic	  divisions	  of	  the	  irrigation	  district,	  and	  they	  are	  elected	  by	  registered	  voters	  in	  their	  area	  to	  serve	  four-­‐year	  terms;	  this	  would	  prove	  important	  during	  the	  negotiation	  process.	  The	  objectives	  of	  MID	  management	  and	  the	  board	  are	  not	  always	  in	  unison,	  as	  the	  water	  transfer	  deal	  was	  to	  make	  apparent.	  	  
Figure	  5:	  The	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  shown	  in	  dark	  green	  (Source:	  OID)	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The	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  sat	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  negotiating	  table	  with	  a	  much	  different	  history	  and	  constituency.	  Staff	  from	  the	  SFPUC	  represented	  and	  brokered	  the	  deal	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  City	  and	  County	  of	  San	  Francisco.	  The	  SFPUC	  provides	  water	  to	  customers	  within	  San	  Francisco	  (whose	  city	  and	  county	  lines	  are	  the	  same),	  and	  then	  sells	  additional	  wholesale	  water	  to	  retailers	  throughout	  the	  Bay	  Area,	  most	  notably	  to	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Water	  Supply	  and	  Conservation	  Agency	  (Figure	  6).	  The	  
Commission	  was	  created	  when	  the	  city	  of	  San	  Francisco	  purchased	  the	  privately	  owned	  Spring	  Valley	  Water	  Company,	  which	  controlled	  much	  of	  the	  regional	  watershed,	  in	  1930.67	  Like	  the	  MID,	  the	  SFPUC	  has	  an	  approving	  body	  (the	  “Commission”)	  of	  five	  members,	  which	  would	  need	  to	  vote	  on	  a	  water	  transfer	  agreement	  once	  finalized.	  Unlike	  the	  MID,	  these	  five	  
Figure	  6:	  Major	  Bay	  Area	  water	  agencies,	  also	  showing	  SFPUC’s	  retail	  customer	  base	  (Source:	  SPUR)	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members	  are	  selected	  by	  city	  government—approved	  by	  the	  SF	  Board	  of	  Supervisors	  after	  being	  nominated	  by	  the	  mayor—and	  are	  thus	  insulated	  from	  public	  elections.	  
San	  Francisco	  and	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  along	  with	  the	  Turlock	  Irrigation	  District,	  possess	  pre-­‐1914	  water	  rights	  to	  the	  Tuolumne	  River.	  As	  earlier	  noted,	  San	  Francisco	  gained	  access	  to	  Tuolumne	  River	  water	  by	  constructing	  a	  dam	  in	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  Valley	  and	  engineering	  an	  advanced	  pipe	  network	  that	  delivered	  this	  snowmelt	  directly	  to	  the	  city	  through	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  1913	  Raker	  Act.	  Within	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Raker	  Act	  lay	  specifications	  limiting	  the	  eventual	  acreage	  that	  both	  the	  MID	  and	  TID	  could	  serve	  to	  300,000	  acres—a	  limit	  currently	  maxed	  out.68	  Further	  down	  the	  Tuolumne	  River,	  the	  1919	  Don	  Pedro	  Project	  created	  the	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir,	  under	  whose	  terms	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  split	  the	  yield	  of	  the	  reservoir	  with	  the	  Turlock	  Irrigation	  District,	  guaranteeing	  it	  deliveries	  of	  300,000	  acre-­‐feet	  a	  year.69	  Figure	  7	  reveals	  this	  infrastructure	  
Figure	  7:	  Water	  infrastructure	  surrounding	  the	  MID,	  including	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  (Source:	  MID)	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as	  well	  as	  the	  piping	  San	  Francisco	  uses	  to	  access	  Tuolumne	  River	  water.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  Reservoir	  lies	  many	  miles	  upstream	  from	  the	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir,	  over	  the	  years	  the	  three	  parties	  sharing	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  have	  brokered	  agreements	  to	  guarantee	  consistent	  deliveries.	  In	  1966,	  the	  three	  parties	  created	  the	  important	  Fourth	  
Agreement	  Between	  the	  City	  and	  County	  of	  San	  Francisco	  and	  the	  Turlock	  Irrigation	  District	  
and	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  water	  bank	  account.70	  Noted	  MID’s	  General	  Counsel	  Tim	  O’Laughlin,	  the	  account	  allows	  the	  SFPUC	  “to	  meet	  the	  senior	  water	  rights	  entitlements	  of	  TID	  and	  MID,	  while	  maximizing	  the	  use	  of	  water	  from	  the	  upstream	  Hetch	  Hetchy	  Project	  to	  meet	  the	  water	  needs	  of	  San	  Francisco's	  customers.	  Basically,	  San	  Francisco	  deposits	  water	  into	  the	  water	  bank	  account	  whenever	  the	  inflow	  to	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir	  exceeds	  the	  TID	  and	  MID	  entitlements;	  conversely,	  San	  Francisco	  debits	  from	  the	  water	  bank	  account	  whenever	  it	  diverts	  or	  stores	  Tuolumne	  River	  water	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  within	  the	  entitlements	  of	  TID	  and	  MID.”71	  	  Secondary	  actors	  Key	  stakeholders	  who	  were	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  negotiating	  agencies	  had	  interests	  in	  this	  deal	  as	  well.	  An	  important	  customer	  of	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  is	  the	  city	  of	  
Modesto,	  which	  receives	  treated	  Tuolumne	  River	  water.	  In	  2005,	  the	  two	  reached	  an	  agreement	  that	  promised	  the	  city	  30	  mgd	  of	  water,	  an	  amount	  that	  would	  double	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  treatment	  plant.	  Significantly,	  Section	  17.1	  of	  the	  2005	  Amended	  Restated	  Treatment	  and	  Delivery	  Agreement	  states	  that	  MID’s	  obligation	  of	  providing	  treated	  water	  to	  the	  city	  “shall	  be	  met	  before	  any	  subsequent	  water	  transfers	  for	  delivery	  of	  water	  outside	  of	  (the)	  district’s	  boundaries.”72	  Whether	  or	  not	  a	  transfer	  agreement	  with	  San	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Francisco	  would	  violate	  MID’s	  commitments	  to	  Modesto	  through	  this	  contract	  would	  become	  a	  bone	  of	  contention	  throughout	  the	  negotiation	  process.	  It	  would	  be	  up	  to	  the	  city’s	  mayor	  and	  councilmembers	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  handle	  a	  potential	  lawsuit	  and	  what	  might	  be	  the	  new	  terms	  for	  an	  amended	  agreement	  with	  the	  MID.	  The	  SFPUC	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  serve	  an	  important	  constituency	  through	  contractual	  obligation	  as	  well.	  The	  Bay	  Area	  Water	  Supply	  and	  Conservation	  Agency	  (BAWSCA)	  is	  a	  conglomeration	  of	  24	  cities	  and	  water	  districts	  plus	  two	  private	  utilities	  south	  of	  San	  Francisco	  (see	  Figure	  6).	  Its	  customer	  base	  spans	  three	  counties	  and	  includes	  businesses,	  organizations,	  and	  1.7	  million	  people.73	  The	  multi-­‐county	  agency	  recently	  completed	  a	  Water	  Supply	  Agreement	  with	  San	  Francisco,	  which	  specified	  long-­‐term	  levels	  of	  service	  and	  water	  reliability	  BAWSCA	  could	  expect	  in	  its	  purchases	  from	  the	  city.	  According	  to	  multiple	  interviews,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  SFPUC	  felt	  it	  needed	  to	  pursue	  additional	  supplies	  of	  water	  in	  part	  to	  satisfy	  obligations	  the	  agency	  had	  to	  BAWSCA,	  particularly	  in	  drought	  years.7475	  There	  were	  even	  indications	  that	  BAWSCA	  was	  calling	  on	  the	  SFPUC	  to	  acquire	  enough	  water	  so	  that	  even	  under	  extended	  drought	  conditions,	  in	  which	  20%	  rationing	  would	  be	  take	  effect	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  BAWSCA	  agencies	  would	  only	  have	  to	  cut	  back	  10%.76	  How	  much	  influence	  BAWSCA	  exerted	  on	  the	  SFPUC	  in	  pursuing	  this	  water	  transfer	  varies	  according	  to	  the	  source,	  but	  they	  clearly	  represented	  an	  interested	  party—particularly	  in	  encouraging	  the	  SFPUC	  to	  initially	  pursue	  a	  transfer.	  	  	  Third	  parties	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  primary	  and	  secondary	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  water	  deal,	  several	  key	  third	  parties	  anticipated	  impacts	  from	  this	  transfer.	  Residents	  of	  Modesto	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voiced	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  transfer	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  announcement.	  No	  one	  can	  say	  whether	  they	  represented	  the	  majority,	  but	  those	  residents	  opposed	  to	  the	  transfer	  were	  undeniably	  more	  vocal,	  filling	  public	  meetings	  and	  penning	  letters	  to	  the	  local	  paper.77	  Their	  animated	  opposition	  persisted	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  the	  city	  threatened	  the	  MID	  with	  a	  lawsuit,	  and	  many	  were	  angry	  when	  legal	  action	  was	  never	  taken.78	  Those	  opposed	  feared	  a	  transfer	  to	  San	  Francisco	  would	  jeopardize	  local	  water	  rights	  or	  unfairly	  force	  Modestans	  to	  cut	  back	  water	  consumption	  even	  further	  in	  dry	  years.	  The	  customer	  base	  of	  the	  MID	  is	  traditionally	  Modesto-­‐area	  farmers.	  Some	  farmers	  individually	  expressed	  issues	  they	  had,	  such	  as	  the	  complications	  of	  selling	  “excess”	  water	  with	  looming	  FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  or	  a	  desire	  to	  see	  water	  transferred	  instead	  to	  neighboring	  farmers.79	  Many	  of	  the	  3000	  farmers	  served	  by	  the	  MID	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau.80	  Importantly,	  in	  2008	  the	  Farm	  Bureau	  adopted	  an	  explicit	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  water	  transfers.	  It	  specified	  that	  if	  certain	  criteria	  were	  met,	  the	  Farm	  Bureau	  could	  support	  water	  transfers	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  (which	  it	  did	  in	  some	  circumstances).	  The	  policy	  required	  that	  no	  transfer	  should	  impair	  or	  lead	  to	  the	  depletion	  of	  groundwater,	  that	  a	  contract	  should	  ensure	  protections	  for	  any	  takings	  to	  increase	  instream	  flows	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  contract,	  and	  that	  the	  transfer	  must	  protect	  in-­‐district	  agricultural	  water	  deliveries	  during	  dry	  years.81	  It	  would	  fall	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Farm	  Bureau	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  contract	  met	  the	  criteria	  of	  its	  policy,	  and	  whether	  to	  throw	  its	  support	  in	  favor	  or	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  transfer.	  However,	  long	  before	  the	  Farm	  Bureau	  publicized	  its	  opinion	  of	  the	  proposal,	  numerous	  farmers	  in	  and	  around	  Modesto	  had	  made	  their	  positions	  on	  the	  water	  transfer	  clear.	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The	  environment,	  as	  represented	  by	  various	  organizations,	  also	  presented	  a	  so-­‐called	  “third	  party”	  that	  could	  be	  adversely	  impacted	  by	  the	  water	  transfer.	  Thus,	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  became	  engaged	  in	  the	  water	  transfer	  controversy	  as	  well.	  The	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  (TRT),	  whose	  mission	  entails	  protecting	  and	  restoring	  the	  river	  through	  stewardship	  efforts,	  was	  wary	  of	  any	  activity	  that	  could	  threaten	  the	  environmental	  health	  of	  the	  river,	  which	  was	  already	  experiencing	  dwindling	  salmon	  counts	  and	  impaired	  water	  quality.82	  The	  group	  had	  a	  history	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  SFPUC,	  which	  derives	  much	  of	  its	  water	  from	  the	  Tuolumne.	  In	  2006,	  the	  TRT	  threatened	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  SFPUC	  for	  its	  neglect	  in	  completing	  a	  required	  study	  to	  accompany	  increased	  diversions	  of	  the	  Tuolumne	  back	  in	  the	  1980s	  for	  hydropower	  purposes,	  and	  to	  avoid	  litigation	  the	  SFPUC	  promised	  to	  meet	  this	  obligation	  in	  2009.83	  The	  TRT	  also	  became	  engaged	  when	  the	  SFPUC	  began	  long-­‐term	  planning	  for	  its	  water	  system	  in	  the	  2000s	  and	  considered	  increasing	  diversions	  from	  the	  river	  to	  enhance	  supply.	  	   San	  Francisco	  had	  been	  investigating	  means	  to	  expand	  its	  water	  supply	  since	  at	  least	  the	  year	  2000.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  released	  its	  Water	  Supply	  Master	  Plan,	  which	  spelled	  out	  long-­‐range	  plans	  for	  the	  water	  system.84	  In	  2008,	  the	  SFPUC	  considered	  a	  Water	  System	  Improvement	  Program	  (WSIP),	  outlining	  future	  steps	  to	  improve	  and	  secure	  the	  delivery	  of	  water	  to	  SFPUC	  customers	  in	  the	  decades	  ahead.	  Though	  per	  capita	  use	  in	  the	  Bay	  Area	  had	  declined,	  the	  SFPUC	  calculated	  it	  would	  need	  roughly	  25	  million	  gallons	  a	  day	  to	  meet	  future	  growth	  and	  to	  account	  for	  water	  lost	  to	  regulatory	  agencies	  requiring	  increased	  flow	  for	  the	  environment.85	  The	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  formed	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Water	  Stewards	  with	  other	  environmental	  groups	  to	  fight	  these	  recommendations	  to	  pursue	  a	  large	  expansion	  of	  new	  water	  supplies.	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They	  successfully	  convinced	  the	  SFPUC	  to	  table	  long	  term	  planning	  till	  2018,	  and	  the	  SFPUC	  adopted	  a	  ”Phased	  WSIP”	  instead.86	  Rather	  than	  expanding	  water	  supply	  by	  diverting	  an	  additional	  25	  mgd,	  this	  version	  called	  for	  increased	  diversions	  of	  only	  2	  mgd	  “in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  delivery	  and	  drought	  reliability	  elements	  through	  2018.”87	  The	  SFPUC	  completed	  the	  required	  Environmental	  Impact	  Report	  for	  this	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  in	  October	  of	  2008.	  Thus,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  San	  Francisco	  to	  pursue	  for	  the	  very	  first	  time	  a	  long-­‐term	  water	  transfer—albeit	  at	  a	  relatively	  small	  volume	  by	  transfer	  standards.	  	  
Summary	  Understanding	  the	  institutional	  framework	  explains	  in	  large	  part	  the	  approach	  to	  this	  water	  transfer.	  Existing	  infrastructure,	  existing	  agreements,	  and	  existing	  relationships	  would	  simplify	  the	  transaction	  from	  a	  regulatory	  perspective,	  as	  did	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  pre-­‐1914	  water	  rights.	  An	  approved	  EIR	  for	  the	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  had	  been	  included	  in	  a	  previously	  completed	  SFPUC	  master	  water	  plan,	  obviating	  the	  need	  for	  additional	  state	  or	  federal	  approval.	  Therefore,	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  framed	  their	  proposal	  based	  on	  sections	  of	  the	  Water	  Code	  and	  policies	  from	  the	  state	  designed	  specifically	  to	  encourage	  more	  water	  transactions	  and	  to	  address	  any	  fears	  of	  losing	  water	  rights.	  They	  acted	  with	  prompting	  by	  one	  contracted	  partner—BAWSCA—and	  facing	  pressure	  from	  another—the	  city	  of	  Modesto.	  California	  law	  and	  court	  precedents	  had	  established	  significant	  protections	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  other	  third	  parties,	  and	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  felt	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  satisfied	  all	  needed	  requirements.	  Of	  course,	  this	  didn’t	  guarantee	  all	  third	  parties	  or	  those	  fearing	  the	  transfer’s	  repercussions	  would	  embrace	  the	  proposal.	  They	  too	  would	  turn	  to	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water	  institutions,	  ranging	  from	  the	  no	  injury	  rule	  to	  portions	  of	  the	  state	  Water	  Code,	  leveraging	  them	  as	  grounds	  for	  challenging	  the	  water	  deal.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  THE	  TRANSFER	  CASE	  	  	   A	  complex	  institutional	  framework	  had	  evolved	  over	  decades	  to	  create	  the	  backdrop	  for	  a	  possible	  water	  transfer	  between	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  and	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District.	  The	  negotiations	  involved	  two	  very	  different	  agencies,	  and	  drew	  the	  attention	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  interest	  groups	  and	  individuals.	  The	  proposal	  was	  born	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  whose	  public	  utility	  commission	  sought	  to	  enhance	  its	  water	  supply,	  and	  died	  with	  the	  board	  of	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  which	  voted	  to	  end	  the	  negotiation	  process.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  navigate	  the	  reader	  chronologically	  through	  the	  key	  events	  in	  the	  process,	  beginning	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  idea	  and	  concluding	  with	  the	  termination	  of	  talks	  between	  the	  agencies.	  This	  will	  set	  up	  the	  exploration	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  key	  factors	  in	  the	  deal’s	  collapse	  in	  the	  ensuing	  chapter.	  	  	  Origins	  of	  the	  deal	  The	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  approached	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  as	  the	  source	  for	  the	  water	  transfer	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  From	  a	  technical	  standpoint,	  it	  was	  the	  simplest	  arrangement.	  The	  SFPUC	  and	  the	  MID	  (along	  with	  the	  Turlock	  Irrigation	  District)	  share	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  through	  historic	  water	  rights.	  No	  new	  aqueducts	  or	  conveyance	  facilities	  would	  need	  to	  be	  constructed	  to	  divert	  water	  from	  one	  party	  to	  the	  other,	  nor	  would	  state	  or	  federal	  water	  project	  infrastructure	  need	  to	  be	  involved.	  Thus	  the	  physical	  infrastructure	  was	  in	  place,	  as	  was	  an	  institutional	  framework:	  the	  Fourth	  Agreement	  between	  the	  agencies	  spelled	  out	  how	  these	  parties	  shared	  and	  could	  potentially	  exchange	  water	  on	  this	  watercourse.88	  Because	  the	  water	  involved	  was	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assessed	  as	  pre-­‐1914	  appropriative	  rights	  water,	  the	  State	  Water	  Resources	  Control	  Board	  would	  not	  need	  to	  provide	  approval.89	  In	  addition,	  the	  two	  parties	  already	  had	  a	  working	  relationship,	  having	  collaborated	  on	  energy	  projects	  and	  restoration	  efforts.90	  	   The	  SFPUC	  also	  perceived	  the	  MID	  as	  a	  receptive	  trading	  partner	  because	  of	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  Modesto	  at	  the	  time.	  Rather	  than	  calculating	  future	  shortfalls	  in	  water	  supply,	  the	  MID	  projected	  a	  need	  for	  additional	  revenue.	  MID	  management	  determined	  its	  water	  delivery	  system	  required	  a	  variety	  of	  projects	  to	  maintain	  and	  improve	  service,	  which,	  when	  totaled	  together,	  would	  cost	  over	  $100	  million.91	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  infrastructure	  improvements,	  the	  MID	  would	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  millions	  more	  in	  the	  re-­‐licensing	  process	  for	  the	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir.	  MID	  management	  saw	  this	  water	  deal	  as	  a	  means	  of	  generating	  the	  necessary	  capital	  for	  these	  expenditures,	  thereby	  protecting	  its	  customers	  from	  rate	  increases	  and	  avoiding	  money	  borrowing.92	  	   For	  both	  parties,	  timing	  also	  played	  a	  factor.	  The	  MID	  sought	  to	  begin	  its	  infrastructure	  upgrades	  right	  away,	  and	  preferred	  to	  fund	  this	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  water	  rather	  than	  other	  financing	  options.	  In	  addition,	  with	  the	  FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  process	  beginning	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years,	  the	  MID	  worried	  that	  it	  might	  be	  forced	  to	  give	  up	  some	  of	  its	  water	  for	  environmental	  purposes—without	  any	  compensation.	  It	  felt	  that	  by	  selling	  water	  to	  an	  urban	  user—the	  highest	  beneficial	  use	  possible—it	  was	  in	  fact	  securing	  these	  water	  rights	  and	  making	  them	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  forfeited.93	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  the	  SFPUC	  wanted	  to	  start	  the	  negotiations	  in	  part	  because	  they	  knew	  how	  long	  such	  a	  process	  could	  take.94	  Even	  more	  important,	  they	  saw	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  making	  this	  deal	  that	  might	  not	  remain	  open	  forever.	  The	  staff	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  had	  a	  good	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  MID	  management,	  whom	  they	  felt	  they	  would	  be	  receptive	  to	  executing	  the	  water	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deal.95	  The	  5-­‐person	  board	  of	  the	  MID	  (which	  would	  ultimately	  have	  to	  approve	  the	  measure),	  also	  appeared	  to	  view	  a	  water	  transfer	  favorably,	  although	  the	  complexion	  of	  the	  board	  could	  change	  with	  upcoming	  elections.	  	  	   Thus,	  the	  stage	  was	  therefore	  set	  for	  the	  two	  parties	  to	  take	  what	  had	  informally	  been	  an	  idea	  in	  years	  past	  to	  an	  actual	  agreement	  that	  could	  be	  drafted,	  approved,	  and	  put	  into	  effect	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  months.	  By	  late	  2011,	  rumors	  of	  a	  possible	  arrangement	  between	  the	  City	  and	  County	  of	  San	  Francisco	  and	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  were	  confirmed	  by	  a	  public	  announcement	  from	  the	  MID.	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TIMELINE	  OF	  EVENTS	  (Figure	  8)
	  
• MID	  announces	  through	  local	  paper	  that	  talks	  have	  begun	  for	  a	  water	  transfer	  with	  San	  Francisco	  
SEPTEMBER	  2011	  
• 4	  separate	  public	  meetings	  are	  held	  by	  MID	  regarding	  proposed	  transfer,	  in	  which	  opposition	  begins	  to	  be	  vocalized	  
OCTOBER	  2011	  
• Campaigning	  against	  water	  transfers,	  Larry	  Byrd	  defeats	  John	  Duarte	  in	  election	  for	  MID	  board	  seat,	  and	  Nick	  Blom	  wins	  other	  seat	  
NOVEMBER	  2011	  
• MID	  board	  votes	  to	  continue	  negotiations	  with	  SFPUC	  on	  transfer	  4-­‐1,	  with	  only	  Larry	  Byrd	  voting	  to	  stop	  talks	  
JANUARY	  2012	  
• TRT	  sends	  a	  letter	  to	  SFPUC	  expressing	  concern	  over	  transfer's	  impact	  on	  river,	  forcing	  SF	  to	  conduct	  an	  investigation	  and	  delaying	  release	  of	  drafted	  contract	  
MARCH	  2012	  
• Draft	  of	  contract	  for	  proposed	  transfer	  is	  released	  APRIL	  2012	  
• City	  of	  Modesto	  sends	  MID	  letter	  expressing	  concern	  with	  transfer,	  indicating	  possibility	  of	  legal	  action	  due	  to	  potential	  conslict	  with	  prior	  contract	  • MID	  board	  postpones	  vote	  on	  contract	  and	  instead	  holds	  public	  hearing	  
MAY	  2012	  
• Vote	  by	  MID	  board	  again	  postponed	  • Revised	  draft	  of	  contract	  is	  released	  and	  vote	  by	  MID	  board	  again	  pushed	  back	  
JUNE	  2012	  
• MID	  staff	  meet	  with	  City	  of	  Modesto	  ofsicials	  in	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  conslicts,	  though	  no	  formal	  agreement	  is	  reached	  between	  two	  sides	  • MID	  board	  delays	  vote	  for	  fourth	  time	  and	  puts	  talks	  with	  SFPUC	  on	  hold	  
JULY	  2012	  
• MID	  reopens	  discussions	  with	  SFPUC,	  sending	  them	  potential	  revisions	  to	  current	  draft	  AUGUST	  2012	  
• SFPUC	  responds	  that	  certain	  changes	  would	  not	  be	  acceptable	  • MID	  board	  votes	  to	  suspend	  negotiations	  on	  deal	  with	  SFPUC	  on	  09/18/12	  
SEPTEMBER	  2012	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The	  announcement	  	   The	  MID’s	  management	  publically	  announced	  the	  start	  of	  water	  deal	  negotiations	  via	  local	  media	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2011.	  According	  to	  a	  leading	  opponent	  of	  the	  transfer,	  nurseryman	  John	  Duarte,	  it	  was	  only	  after	  he	  came	  forward	  at	  a	  board	  meeting	  of	  the	  MID	  in	  late	  summer	  of	  2011	  and	  inquired	  about	  rumors	  of	  a	  water	  deal	  that	  the	  MID	  made	  the	  news	  public.96	  In	  September	  of	  2011,	  the	  MID	  went	  to	  the	  editorial	  staff	  of	  the	  local	  paper,	  and	  the	  next	  day	  the	  story	  was	  published	  in	  the	  Modesto	  Bee.97	  A	  couple	  weeks	  later	  the	  MID	  General	  Manager	  announced	  on	  a	  Sacramento	  TV	  channel’s	  news	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  deal.	  To	  answer	  questions	  and	  to	  begin	  to	  outline	  the	  possible	  deal	  to	  its	  customers,	  the	  MID	  held	  four	  public	  meetings	  in	  October	  2011.98	  Though	  the	  responses	  ranged	  from	  positive	  to	  negative,	  it	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  comments	  that	  a	  fervent	  group	  opposed	  any	  water	  deal	  involving	  San	  Francisco.	  	  	   While	  the	  MID	  was	  unveiling	  its	  tentative	  proposal	  for	  a	  water	  sale,	  the	  election	  races	  for	  two	  of	  the	  five	  MID	  board	  seats	  were	  coming	  to	  a	  close.	  This	  forced	  the	  water	  sale	  into	  the	  election	  debates,	  and	  several	  of	  the	  candidates	  came	  out	  on	  record	  as	  opposing	  a	  water	  sale	  to	  San	  Francisco.	  They	  included	  Nick	  Blom,	  who	  won	  the	  predominantly	  agricultural	  5th	  Division,	  and	  Larry	  Byrd,	  who	  narrowly	  edged	  out	  the	  equally	  fervent	  opponent	  to	  the	  water	  sale,	  John	  Duarte,	  to	  win	  the	  1st	  Division.	  The	  newly	  elected	  members	  had	  an	  immediate	  opportunity	  to	  exhibit	  their	  stance,	  as	  the	  MID	  board	  voted	  in	  January	  2012	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  permit	  the	  MID	  staff	  to	  continue	  negotiations	  on	  the	  water	  deal.99	  Only	  Larry	  Byrd	  voted	  to	  cease	  the	  negotiations	  at	  that	  moment,	  outnumbered	  4	  to	  1,	  while	  Nick	  Blom	  drew	  the	  ire	  of	  some	  critics	  by	  voting	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  negotiations.	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   The	  transition	  on	  the	  MID	  board	  also	  coincided	  with	  a	  shift	  in	  California’s	  climate.	  Though	  the	  entire	  state	  was	  experiencing	  normal	  weather	  patterns	  with	  adequate	  precipitation	  when	  the	  negotiation	  discussions	  began	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2011,	  on	  the	  final	  day	  of	  2011	  Northern	  California	  was	  determined	  by	  climate	  data	  to	  be	  “abnormally	  dry.”100	  By	  January	  2012—during	  the	  first	  MID	  board	  vote	  on	  the	  negotiations—both	  San	  Francisco	  and	  Modesto	  were	  experiencing	  moderate	  drought	  conditions,	  and	  on	  March	  13	  both	  areas	  reached	  a	  peak	  of	  D2	  “severe	  drought.”101	  	   In	  San	  Francisco,	  the	  water	  deal	  progressed	  with	  much	  less	  fanfare.	  The	  SFPUC	  did	  not	  come	  to	  the	  papers	  or	  local	  media	  to	  publicize	  the	  deal,	  and	  the	  media	  in	  turn	  did	  not	  publish	  stories	  on	  the	  deal.	  Unlike	  their	  Modesto	  counterparts,	  San	  Francisco	  residents	  did	  not	  speak	  out	  either	  in	  favor	  or	  in	  opposition	  against	  the	  deal,	  at	  this	  point	  or	  at	  any	  other	  stage.102	  The	  SFPUC	  General	  Manager	  had	  expressed	  his	  backing	  of	  the	  transfer	  but	  took	  little	  direct	  part	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  unlike	  his	  MID	  counterpart.	  The	  negotiations	  were	  left	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  veteran	  members	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  staff	  that	  already	  had	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  MID.	  These	  staff	  members	  were	  negotiating	  with	  prior	  approval	  by	  the	  SFPUC	  commissioners	  for	  a	  2	  mgd	  transfer,	  confirmed	  in	  the	  completed	  EIR.103	  SFPUC	  staff	  remained	  in	  communication	  with	  the	  Commission,	  which	  took	  a	  much	  less	  active	  part	  in	  the	  negotiations	  than	  its	  counterpart,	  the	  MID	  board	  of	  directors.	  While	  the	  MID	  staff	  continued	  to	  generate	  content	  for	  the	  media	  and	  publicize	  the	  transfer,	  the	  negotiators	  from	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  quietly	  hammered	  out	  the	  details	  of	  a	  draft	  agreement	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  They	  were	  preparing	  to	  release	  a	  full	  version	  of	  the	  contract	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  March	  2012	  when	  they	  encountered	  a	  stubborn	  source	  of	  resistance:	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust.	  The	  TRT	  sent	  a	  March	  28	  letter	  to	  the	  SFPUC	  that	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outlined	  its	  issues	  with	  the	  transfer	  and	  set	  the	  table	  for	  possible	  legal	  challenges.104	  Their	  primary	  concern	  was	  the	  stretch	  of	  the	  Tuolumne	  between	  where	  San	  Francisco	  would	  make	  its	  additional	  diversions	  high	  in	  the	  Sierras	  and	  the	  36	  miles	  downstream	  the	  river	  had	  to	  flow	  with	  this	  deficit	  until	  reaching	  the	  MID.	  Though	  the	  2008	  WSIP	  had	  approved	  an	  EIR	  for	  an	  additional	  2	  mgd	  transfer,	  the	  TRT	  felt	  this	  was	  based	  on	  outdated	  baseline	  data	  and	  that	  the	  impacts	  on	  the	  36-­‐mile	  stretch	  in	  particular	  had	  not	  been	  adequately	  assessed.105	  Additionally,	  the	  aforementioned	  study	  from	  the	  1980s	  that	  the	  SFPUC	  had	  promised	  to	  execute	  in	  2009	  had	  still	  not	  been	  completed,	  and	  the	  TRT	  felt	  it	  was	  irresponsible	  to	  consider	  additional	  releases	  while	  this	  outstanding	  study	  remained	  long	  overdue.	  Finally,	  The	  TRT	  believed	  the	  pursuit	  of	  increased	  supply	  to	  be	  unnecessary	  and	  wasteful	  in	  light	  of	  declining	  Bay	  Area	  water	  use	  trends.106	  	   The	  TRT	  won	  a	  small	  victory	  as	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  agreed	  to	  delay	  the	  release	  of	  the	  draft	  agreement	  while	  a	  firm	  was	  hired	  to	  investigate	  potential	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  the	  proposed	  transfer.107	  The	  firm	  issued	  a	  30-­‐page	  report	  finding	  no	  threat	  posed	  to	  the	  river	  by	  the	  transfer.108	  The	  TRT	  did	  not	  move	  forward	  with	  legal	  action,	  but	  continued	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  the	  transfer	  at	  public	  hearings	  and	  through	  an	  internet	  campaign.109	  The	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  meanwhile	  proceeded	  and	  released	  a	  draft	  of	  the	  transfer	  at	  the	  end	  of	  April	  2012,	  with	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  contract	  scheduled	  for	  May	  by	  the	  MID	  board.	  If	  approved,	  diversions	  from	  the	  river	  could	  begin	  as	  early	  as	  July	  1	  of	  that	  year.	  	  The	  first	  draft	  	   There	  were	  a	  variety	  of	  reactions	  to	  the	  drafted	  transfer	  agreement,	  which	  had	  many	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  had	  already	  been	  raised	  in	  public	  discussion	  sessions	  and	  media	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releases.	  Over	  100	  people	  packed	  into	  the	  MID	  board	  room	  after	  the	  draft	  had	  been	  released	  for	  public	  comment,	  with	  many	  vocalizing	  strong	  opposition.110	  However,	  the	  most	  significant	  response	  came	  later	  from	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  whose	  elected	  officials	  indicated	  that	  they	  had	  concerns	  about	  the	  deal	  and	  might	  consider	  legal	  action	  to	  prevent	  it.	  	  	   The	  basis	  for	  Modesto’s	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  MID	  stemmed	  from	  the	  2005	  contract	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  treated	  water	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto.	  The	  transfer	  draft	  agreement	  might	  jeopardize	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  MID	  to	  provide	  Modesto’s	  full	  allotment,	  because	  San	  Francisco	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  its	  entire	  portion	  through	  the	  “first	  right	  of	  refusal.”111	  This	  would	  entitle	  San	  Francisco	  to	  take	  its	  entire	  allotment	  in	  years	  of	  extreme	  drought	  even	  if	  the	  MID	  had	  to	  make	  cutbacks	  in	  its	  deliveries.	  Through	  the	  Amended	  Restated	  Treatment	  and	  Delivery	  Agreement	  (ARTDA)	  between	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  and	  the	  MID,	  agricultural	  customers	  and	  the	  city	  distribute	  any	  reductions	  equally.112	  Therefore,	  the	  proposed	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer	  appeared	  to	  specifically	  violate	  language	  in	  the	  2005	  ARTDA	  promising	  Modesto	  its	  water	  “before	  any	  subsequent	  water	  transfers.”113	  Additionally,	  Modesto	  believed	  this	  transfer	  potentially	  violated	  the	  California	  Water	  Code,	  whose	  Section	  1014	  stated	  that	  any	  water	  transfer	  should	  not	  cause	  the	  loss	  or	  reduction	  of	  any	  contractual	  right	  to	  use	  that	  water.114	  The	  MID	  in	  turn	  replied	  that	  the	  2,240	  af	  promised	  in	  the	  transfer—a	  relatively	  small	  amount—already	  was	  available,	  so	  that	  even	  in	  dry	  years	  San	  Francisco	  and	  all	  MID	  customers	  could	  receive	  their	  respective	  allotments.115	  	  	   Modesto	  was	  not	  convinced	  by	  MID’s	  assurances,	  and	  in	  May	  of	  2012	  hired	  attorneys	  mailed	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  MID	  expressing	  the	  city’s	  position	  and	  setting	  the	  grounds	  for	  potential	  litigation	  before	  the	  board	  voted	  on	  the	  sale.	  Modesto	  mayor	  Garrad	  Marsh	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said	  he	  responded	  to	  issues	  raised	  by	  Modesto	  residents	  and	  the	  city	  council,	  and	  authorized	  the	  city	  to	  hire	  attorneys	  to	  express	  in	  the	  letter	  concerns	  that	  the	  water	  transfer	  might	  violate	  terms	  of	  the	  previous	  contract.116	  Councilman	  David	  Geer	  even	  signed	  an	  online	  petition	  opposing	  the	  transfer,	  and	  vocalized	  a	  sentiment	  held	  by	  many	  when	  he	  expressed	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  MID	  to	  negotiate	  a	  deal	  that	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  MID	  customers,	  from	  farmers	  to	  Modesto	  city	  residents.117	  	  	   Modesto’s	  threat	  of	  legal	  action	  forced	  the	  MID	  board	  to	  postpone	  its	  vote	  on	  the	  water	  sale.	  Instead	  of	  voting	  on	  May	  22,	  2012,	  the	  MID	  agreed	  to	  hold	  an	  informal	  session	  on	  the	  sale	  that	  day	  open	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  comments	  heard	  at	  the	  May	  22	  meeting	  were	  mostly	  from	  opponents	  of	  the	  sale,	  particularly	  from	  members	  of	  the	  agricultural	  community.118	  Still,	  the	  MID	  forged	  ahead	  and	  scheduled	  a	  new	  date	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  water	  transfer	  in	  late	  June.	  Until	  then,	  staff	  would	  work	  on	  amending	  the	  presently	  drafted	  contract	  to	  address	  concerns	  about	  priority	  of	  water	  in	  dry	  years	  and	  other	  issues.	  	  	   The	  local	  paper	  the	  Modesto	  Bee,	  which	  had	  been	  closely	  following	  the	  news	  of	  the	  possible	  deal	  and	  even	  broke	  the	  story	  in	  late	  2011,	  by	  May	  had	  formulated	  an	  editorial	  position	  on	  the	  transfer	  and	  began	  to	  feature	  more	  editorials	  and	  op-­‐eds	  as	  debate	  heated	  up.	  The	  official	  position	  of	  the	  Bee	  in	  mid-­‐May	  was	  that	  the	  initial	  2,240	  af	  transfer	  should	  proceed,	  but	  that	  the	  larger	  25,000	  af	  transfer	  should	  undergo	  rigorous	  review	  and	  analysis	  paid	  for	  by	  the	  SFPUC—as	  the	  contract	  specified.119	  Over	  the	  next	  several	  weeks,	  the	  Bee	  featured	  concise	  opinion	  pieces	  by	  leaders	  in	  the	  community	  expressing	  their	  arguments	  for	  or	  against	  the	  deal,	  and	  as	  months	  went	  by	  the	  Bee	  itself	  became	  more	  involved	  in	  editorial	  pieces	  which	  criticized	  the	  negotiation	  process	  and	  offered	  recommendations	  for	  ways	  to	  proceed	  to	  the	  MID—recommendations	  that	  were	  often	  adopted.	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   Also	  around	  mid-­‐2012,	  opponents	  of	  the	  transfer	  began	  to	  organize.	  Some	  approaches	  were	  more	  moderate,	  such	  as	  calls	  for	  increased	  water	  rates	  (supported	  by	  many	  farmers	  in	  fact)	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  advisory	  committee	  to	  assess	  MID’s	  water	  system.	  Others	  took	  more	  drastic	  measures.	  In	  June	  of	  2012,	  John	  Duarte,	  the	  nurseryman	  defeated	  by	  Larry	  Byrd	  in	  the	  MID	  board	  elections,	  formed	  a	  Public	  Action	  Committee	  with	  agriculturalist	  Reed	  Smith	  to	  block	  the	  water	  sale.	  They	  raised	  thousands	  of	  dollars,	  hoping	  to	  mount	  a	  petition	  drive	  in	  which	  a	  voter	  referendum	  could	  overrule	  a	  possible	  MID	  vote	  on	  the	  sale,	  based	  on	  a	  section	  of	  the	  Water	  Code	  that	  permits	  voters	  to	  petition	  for	  a	  repeal	  of	  an	  ordinance.120	  In	  addition,	  they	  hoped	  to	  fund	  a	  special	  election	  to	  recall	  those	  they	  saw	  as	  vulnerable	  members	  of	  the	  board.	  They	  even	  hired	  lawyers	  to	  consider	  filing	  a	  lawsuit	  in	  regards	  to	  possible	  third-­‐party	  impacts.	  While	  raising	  funds	  for	  these	  efforts,	  the	  group	  worked	  to	  spread	  awareness	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  a	  water	  sale	  via	  alternative	  media	  channels	  and	  rally	  others	  who	  might	  step	  forward	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  water	  deal.	  They	  approached	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  and	  convinced	  them	  to	  support	  their	  position.121	  The	  Stanislaus	  Taxpayers	  Association	  came	  forward	  as	  well,	  threatening	  to	  sue	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  agreement	  would	  imperil	  an	  obligation	  the	  city	  had	  to	  provide	  water	  to	  its	  citizens.122	  	  The	  second	  draft	  	   Behind	  the	  scenes,	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  contract	  struggled	  to	  accommodate	  competing	  interests	  as	  they	  drafted	  a	  new	  version	  of	  the	  agreement.	  A	  revised	  draft	  was	  expected	  by	  the	  end	  of	  May,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  arrive	  until	  late	  June	  of	  2012.	  Key	  changes	  included	  a	  clause	  stating	  that	  the	  MID	  would	  meet	  its	  obligations	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  language	  indicating	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both	  parties	  would	  share	  the	  cost	  of	  defending	  the	  agreement	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  lawsuit,	  and	  the	  ability	  for	  the	  MID	  to	  leave	  the	  deal	  before	  the	  50-­‐year	  term	  was	  up.123	  Responding	  to	  public	  pressure	  and	  following	  the	  recommendation	  of	  a	  Modesto	  Bee	  editorial,	  the	  MID	  board	  pushed	  back	  its	  vote	  on	  this	  revised	  draft	  to	  late	  July	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  review	  and	  public	  comment.	  	  The	  public	  certainly	  commented,	  as	  did	  those	  close	  to	  the	  proceedings—namely	  MID	  board	  member	  Larry	  Byrd.	  Byrd	  had	  been	  vocal	  about	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  had	  been	  announced—while	  running	  as	  a	  candidate	  for	  the	  board,	  upon	  being	  elected,	  and	  throughout	  the	  negotiation	  process	  he	  was	  consistently	  opposed	  to	  it.	  In	  the	  local	  Modesto	  newspaper,	  Byrd	  published	  a	  thorough	  op-­‐ed	  detailing	  his	  many	  points	  of	  contention	  with	  the	  draft	  agreement.124	  The	  main	  issue	  was	  San	  Francisco’s	  entitlement	  to	  first	  right	  of	  refusal,	  restricting	  the	  MID’s	  ability	  to	  deliver	  water	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  or	  to	  engage	  in	  other	  water	  sales	  within	  the	  river	  basin.125	  Other	  vocal	  opponents	  of	  the	  proposal	  penned	  op-­‐eds	  in	  the	  Modesto	  Bee,	  including	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Stanislaus	  Taxpayers	  Association.	  The	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  formally	  disclosed	  their	  position	  opposing	  the	  transfer	  in	  its	  current	  state	  through	  the	  paper,	  citing	  elements	  of	  its	  water	  transfer	  policy	  which	  it	  felt	  the	  MID	  violated.126	  Those	  willing	  to	  express	  their	  support	  of	  the	  transfer	  publically	  also	  wrote	  in	  to	  the	  paper,	  such	  as	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  school	  board	  who	  feared	  the	  impact	  of	  potentially	  higher	  water	  rates	  on	  school	  budgets.127	  While	  public	  debate	  about	  the	  possible	  water	  transaction	  roiled,	  key	  officials	  met	  quietly	  to	  discuss	  one	  of	  the	  most	  problematic	  elements	  of	  the	  deal:	  obligations	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto.	  In	  spite	  of	  modifications	  to	  the	  contract,	  Mayor	  Garrad	  Marsh	  noted	  he	  still	  had	  issues	  with	  it,	  saying,	  “I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  it	  is	  now.	  I	  don't	  think	  the	  language	  is	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something	  I'm	  comfortable	  with."128	  At	  a	  July	  2012	  meeting	  prompted	  by	  the	  Modesto	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  the	  MID	  general	  manager	  and	  the	  mayor	  discussed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  drafted	  agreement	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  the	  City	  of	  Modesto	  to	  guarantee	  delivery	  of	  the	  water	  promised	  to	  the	  city	  from	  the	  2005	  ARTDA.129	  The	  public	  continued	  to	  apply	  pressure	  for	  more	  drastic	  action,	  however.	  Opponents	  of	  the	  sale	  urged	  a	  special	  meeting	  of	  the	  Modesto	  City	  Council	  to	  initiate	  legal	  action	  before	  the	  MID	  board	  could	  vote	  on	  the	  sale,	  while	  supporters	  lobbied	  the	  city	  council	  and	  asked	  that	  they	  permit	  the	  transaction	  to	  move	  ahead.130	  	   With	  time	  running	  out	  before	  the	  scheduled	  July	  24th	  vote	  on	  the	  water	  sale,	  criticism	  increasing	  from	  all	  sides,	  and	  talks	  about	  a	  possible	  agreement	  on	  the	  side	  with	  Modesto	  unresolved,	  the	  MID	  board	  elected	  for	  the	  fourth	  time	  to	  delay	  its	  vote	  on	  the	  water	  sale.	  MID	  staff	  focused	  on	  constructing	  a	  side	  agreement	  with	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  and	  direct	  talks	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  SFPUC	  were	  put	  on	  hold.	  These	  were	  all,	  coincidentally,	  recommendations	  found	  in	  editorial	  pieces	  of	  the	  Modesto	  Bee,131	  raising	  the	  likelihood	  that	  through	  its	  editorial	  arm	  the	  paper	  may	  have	  had	  some	  influence	  on	  MID	  decisions.	  	  The	  state	  of	  negotiations	  	   In	  August,	  the	  MID	  reinitiated	  discussions	  with	  the	  SFPUC.	  After	  productive	  sessions	  between	  MID	  management	  and	  city	  of	  Modesto	  officials,	  the	  MID	  sent	  the	  SFPUC	  a	  number	  of	  concerns	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  MID	  board	  and	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  which	  it	  hoped	  could	  be	  addressed	  through	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  contract.132	  Though	  no	  new	  agreement	  had	  been	  reached	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  they	  hoped	  adjustments	  to	  the	  contract	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would	  alleviate	  their	  concerns.	  According	  to	  the	  Modesto	  mayor	  in	  a	  later	  interview,	  one	  proposal	  was	  to	  have	  Modesto	  and	  San	  Francisco	  experience	  equal	  cutbacks	  in	  cases	  of	  extreme	  drought.133	  Larry	  Byrd	  of	  the	  MID	  board	  meanwhile	  sought	  further	  modifications	  on	  the	  first	  right	  of	  refusal	  and	  the	  MID’s	  flexibility	  in	  leaving	  the	  contract.134	  	   Many	  weeks	  went	  by	  while	  the	  MID	  awaited	  a	  response	  from	  the	  SFPUC.	  During	  this	  time,	  members	  of	  the	  MID	  board	  felt	  pressure	  mounting	  to	  terminate	  the	  deal,	  from	  within	  and	  without.	  John	  Duarte	  continued	  to	  apply	  pressure	  on	  the	  MID	  board,	  threatening	  a	  special	  election	  to	  recall	  certain	  members	  but	  also	  setting	  up	  lunch	  meetings	  to	  discuss	  the	  water	  transfer	  with	  board	  members	  in	  calmer	  terms.135	  Outsiders	  speculate	  that	  within	  the	  MID	  board,	  Larry	  Byrd	  cajoled	  and	  coerced	  the	  board	  members	  one	  by	  one	  into	  opposing	  the	  transfer.136	  	   As	  the	  SFPUC	  staff	  considered	  the	  proposed	  revisions	  of	  the	  MID,	  it	  found	  certain	  elements	  unacceptable.	  Because	  of	  the	  high	  price	  it	  would	  pay	  for	  the	  water,	  and	  because	  it	  was	  pursuing	  this	  water	  as	  drought	  insurance,	  it	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  reduce	  its	  allotment	  of	  the	  2	  mgd	  during	  dry	  years.137	  They	  were	  also	  uncomfortable	  with	  a	  proposal	  that	  would	  allow	  the	  MID	  to	  terminate	  the	  agreement	  at	  any	  time,	  which	  could	  endanger	  its	  water	  supply.138	  The	  SFPUC	  finally	  responded	  in	  September	  2012	  to	  the	  MID,	  indicating	  their	  objections	  to	  these	  particular	  recommendations.	  	   The	  MID	  responded	  swiftly	  and	  definitively.	  Larry	  Byrd	  held	  a	  closed	  session	  with	  the	  MID	  board,	  and	  forced	  a	  vote	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  suspend	  negotiations	  with	  the	  SFPUC	  on	  September	  18,	  2012.139	  When	  the	  votes	  were	  tallied,	  the	  decision	  was	  a	  unanimous	  5	  to	  0	  in	  favor	  of	  suspending	  negotiations,	  effectively	  terminating	  the	  water	  transfer	  deal.	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Summary	  	   The	  MID	  board	  had	  come	  a	  long	  way	  from	  its	  4	  to	  1	  vote	  in	  January,	  when	  only	  one	  member	  voted	  to	  cease	  negotiations	  on	  the	  deal.	  The	  resumption	  of	  talks	  between	  the	  parties	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing.	  Thus,	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  water	  deal	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  the	  SFPUC	  appeared	  to	  have	  stopped	  with	  the	  MID	  board.	  Understanding	  the	  motivations	  for	  the	  change	  of	  the	  board’s	  position	  is	  paramount	  to	  answering	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  getting	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  why	  this	  deal	  fell	  apart.	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CHAPTER	  4:	  THE	  ANALYSIS	  	  	   This	  thesis	  set	  out	  to	  explore	  why	  the	  proposed	  water	  transfer	  between	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  (acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  City	  and	  County	  of	  San	  Francisco)	  and	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  did	  not	  go	  through.	  It	  combines	  a	  hypothesis	  investigating	  the	  congruity	  of	  assorted	  parties’	  explanations	  for	  the	  deal’s	  collapse	  with	  research	  questions	  exploring	  the	  nuances	  of	  this	  failure.	  These	  research	  questions	  are	  answered	  in	  this	  chapter	  through	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  data	  collected.	  I	  then	  posit	  a	  framework	  through	  which	  to	  understand	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  negotiation:	  three	  spheres	  of	  conflict—internal,	  contractual,	  and	  external—which,	  when	  unresolved	  and	  combined	  together,	  thwarted	  the	  deal.	  	  Interview	  results	  	   Interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  individuals	  involved	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process,	  and	  with	  those	  who	  had	  closely	  followed	  the	  deal	  from	  its	  inception.	  The	  subjects	  included	  at	  least	  one	  representative	  from	  the	  MID,	  from	  the	  SFPUC,	  from	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  from	  the	  agricultural	  community,	  and	  from	  the	  environmental	  groups	  concerned	  about	  the	  Tuolumne	  River.	  The	  thesis	  benefitted	  by	  gaining	  access	  to	  one	  of	  the	  key	  negotiators	  of	  the	  drafted	  contract	  and	  one	  of	  the	  influential	  members	  of	  the	  MID	  board.	  Interviewees	  divulged	  factors	  they	  felt	  most	  pivotal	  to	  the	  deal’s	  collapse	  through	  open-­‐ended	  questioning,	  and	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  succinctly	  explain	  in	  their	  own	  words	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  termination.	  Though	  the	  review	  of	  the	  interview	  responses	  was	  qualitative,	  a	  tabular	  spreadsheet	  was	  created	  to	  code	  and	  align	  the	  varying	  explanations	  and	  factors	  provided	  (See	  Appendix	  C).	  All	  interviewee	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responses,	  in	  addition	  to	  information	  gathered	  from	  published	  articles,	  meeting	  minutes,	  and	  recorded	  public	  statements,	  provided	  a	  wealth	  of	  data	  used	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  posed	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
Null	  hypothesis:	  Based	  on	  the	  accounts	  of	  various	  parties,	  the	  explanations	  for	  the	  
termination	  of	  the	  proposed	  water	  transfer	  are	  generally	  in	  agreement	  	   At	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  water	  deal	  failed	  simply	  because	  the	  MID	  board	  voted	  to	  end	  negotiations.	  No	  individual	  familiar	  with	  the	  case	  would	  deny	  this	  fact.	  However,	  digging	  deeper	  into	  the	  motivation	  for	  this	  vote	  and	  why	  it	  came	  about	  brings	  us	  to	  more	  nuanced	  and	  diverse	  theories	  from	  the	  individuals	  interviewed.	  When	  asked	  the	  basic	  question:	  “Why	  did	  this	  deal	  collapse?”	  interviewees	  proposed	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  
REPORTED	  FACTORS	  IN	  TRANSFER'S	  COLLAPSE	  
NUMBER	  OF	  
INTERVIEWEES	  REPORTING	  
Pressure	  on	  MID	  board	  from	  varied	  opposition	   7	  
Culture	  averse	  to	  exporting	  irrigation	  water	  to	  SF	   7	  
Right	  of	  first	  refusal	  could	  not	  be	  negotiated	   6	  
Concern	  with	  meeting	  all	  dry	  year	  obligations	   5	  
Threat	  of	  legal	  action	  from	  city	  of	  Modesto	   4	  
Nature	  of	  swing	  vote	  on	  MID	  board	   4	  
Leadership	  issues	  within	  MID	   4	  
Long	  term	  of	  contract	  with	  no	  opt-­‐out	  for	  MID	   3	  
Fear	  of	  larger	  water	  deal	  down	  the	  line	   3	  
FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  /	  exhibiting	  "excess"	  of	  water	   2	  
Doubt	  about	  need	  and	  costs	  of	  retrofits	   2	  
Concern	  about	  losing	  water	  rights	  permanently	  via	  deal	   2	  
Lack	  of	  trust	  in	  MID	   2	  
PAC	  pressure	  on	  specific	  board	  members	   1	  
Figure	  9:	  Factors	  as	  reported	  by	  nine	  interviewees,	  in	  order	  of	  recurrence	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some	  of	  which	  were	  entirely	  different	  from	  each	  other.	  Based	  on	  the	  interview	  responses	  and	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  available	  data,	  the	  key	  factors	  have	  been	  organized	  into	  a	  table,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  10.	  Some	  interviewees	  brought	  up	  factors	  almost	  entirely	  unique	  from	  others.	  In	  other	  instances,	  even	  individuals	  on	  opposite	  sides	  of	  the	  negotiating	  table	  agreed	  on	  key	  sticking	  points,	  such	  as	  the	  first	  right	  of	  refusal	  for	  San	  Francisco.	  Still,	  though	  there	  were	  areas	  of	  overlap,	  no	  two	  respondents	  used	  the	  same	  set	  of	  factors	  to	  explain	  the	  transfer’s	  collapse.	  Thus,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected.	  	  	   	  
	  
KEY	  FACTORS	  IN	  TRANSFER'S	  COLLAPSE	  
INTERNAL	  
ISSUES	  
Adamant	  opposition	  led	  by	  single	  member	  of	  MID	  board	  
Inability	  of	  board	  president	  to	  create	  unity	  among	  board	  members	  
Growing	  distrust	  and	  tension	  between	  MID	  staff	  and	  members	  of	  board	  
CONTRACTUAL	  
CONFLICTS	  
Existing	  contract	  between	  MID	  and	  Modesto	  could	  be	  breached	  by	  SF	  deal	  
SFPUC	  unwilling	  to	  negotiate	  on	  first	  right	  of	  refusal	  
Three	  parties	  could	  not	  find	  satisfactory	  arrangement	  for	  dry	  year	  situations	  
Length	  of	  deal	  with	  no	  opt-­‐out	  concerned	  some	  in	  MID	  
THIRD-­‐PARTY	  
CONCERNS	  
Fear	  of	  cutbacks	  during	  dry	  years	  due	  to	  transfer	  
Doubt	  about	  needs	  and	  costs	  of	  retrofits	  
Concern	  from	  Modestans	  about	  permanently	  losing	  water	  to	  SF	  
Desire	  to	  keep	  water	  local	  among	  Modestans	  and	  boost	  agricultural	  economy	  
Worries	  about	  environmental	  regulation	  
Figure	  10:	  Key	  factors	  as	  determined	  through	  analysis,	  grouped	  by	  sphere	  of	  conflict	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  What	  were	  the	  different	  factors,	  and	  their	  magnitude	  of	  impact,	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  water	  transfer?	  	   The	  interviewees	  may	  not	  have	  agreed	  universally	  on	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  deal’s	  collapse,	  but	  they	  highlighted	  some	  of	  the	  same	  important	  factors.	  Several	  respondents	  brought	  up	  the	  leadership	  and	  character	  of	  the	  MID	  board	  members.	  Peter	  Drekmeier,	  who	  followed	  the	  negotiation	  process	  closely	  as	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Program	  Director	  for	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust,	  credits	  MID	  board	  member	  Larry	  Byrd	  as	  the	  primary	  reason	  the	  water	  deal	  did	  not	  go	  through.140	  Byrd’s	  steadfast	  refusal	  to	  support	  the	  transfer	  from	  the	  very	  beginning,	  combined	  with	  his	  ability	  to	  apply	  internal	  pressure	  on	  board	  members	  sitting	  on	  the	  fence,	  were	  unparalleled	  by	  any	  advocate	  of	  the	  deal.141	  Conversely,	  the	  editor	  of	  the	  Modesto	  Bee	  opinion	  pages,	  Judy	  Sly,	  adamantly	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  leadership	  from	  the	  MID	  board’s	  president	  or	  any	  other	  board	  member	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  deal	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  its	  termination.142	  No	  one	  could	  counter	  Byrd’s	  resolute	  opposition	  and	  motion	  to	  vote	  early	  on	  the	  deal	  when	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  board	  may	  have	  supported	  it.	  Sly,	  along	  with	  other	  respondents,	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  swing	  vote	  on	  the	  board,	  Paul	  Warda,	  as	  a	  key	  figure.	  The	  aging	  Warda	  was	  in	  poor	  health	  and	  planned	  to	  step	  down	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term,	  and	  interviewees	  believe	  these	  factors	  led	  him	  to	  choose	  the	  path	  that	  would	  be	  least	  controversial	  as	  he	  retired.143	  	   Indeed,	  a	  desire	  by	  the	  board	  to	  avoid	  controversy	  was	  cited	  by	  nearly	  all	  interviewees	  as	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  MID’s	  vote	  to	  suspend	  the	  process.	  As	  2012	  progressed,	  filled	  with	  testy	  public	  meetings	  and	  prolonged	  negotiations,	  the	  board	  members	  likely	  realized	  they	  would	  experience	  a	  much	  greater	  backlash	  should	  they	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  water	  transfer	  than	  against	  it.	  Deciding	  to	  vote	  against	  a	  controversial	  deal	  might	  seem	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hardly	  worth	  mentioning	  as	  a	  factor,	  except	  that	  the	  counterpart	  in	  the	  deal—San	  Francisco—frequently	  did	  just	  the	  opposite.	  Ed	  Harrington,	  the	  former	  General	  Manager	  of	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission,	  noted	  that	  officials	  in	  San	  Francisco	  were	  used	  to	  controversy	  and	  battles,	  but	  their	  MID	  counterparts	  were	  not.	  He	  said,	  “the	  board	  [of	  MID]	  just	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  having	  that	  kind	  of	  political	  fight	  on	  their	  hands.”144	  	   The	  water	  transfer	  proposal	  stoked	  controversy	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  but	  one	  nearly	  all	  interviewees	  agreed	  upon:	  its	  potential	  conflict	  with	  an	  existing	  city	  of	  Modesto	  contract.	  Because	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  had	  reason	  to	  believe	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  deal	  could	  breach	  specific	  language	  in	  its	  2005	  contract	  with	  the	  MID	  for	  treated	  water	  deliveries,	  the	  city	  threatened	  legal	  action.145	  This	  got	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  MID	  and	  derailed	  some	  of	  the	  momentum	  of	  the	  deal	  as	  the	  MID	  postponed	  its	  vote	  on	  the	  contract	  several	  times	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  litigation.	  	   Of	  course,	  legal	  action	  by	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  may	  have	  been	  more	  of	  a	  bargaining	  tactic	  than	  a	  realistic	  threat,	  as	  an	  actual	  lawsuit	  could	  cost	  these	  two	  agencies	  millions	  of	  taxpayer	  dollars.	  Indeed,	  Modesto	  asked	  to	  sit	  at	  the	  table	  directly	  with	  the	  SFPUC	  to	  consider	  different	  options,	  and	  when	  this	  was	  not	  possible	  they	  sent	  a	  proposal	  of	  modifications	  to	  the	  drafted	  contract.146	  They	  never	  filed	  a	  lawsuit.	  Modesto	  Mayor	  Garrad	  Marsh,	  involved	  in	  these	  discussions,	  believes	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  may	  have	  accepted	  a	  modified	  proposal	  and	  dropped	  threats	  of	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  MID	  if	  its	  concerns	  were	  addressed	  by	  the	  SFPUC.147	  The	  SFPUC	  could	  not	  accept	  the	  revisions	  proposed	  by	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  alongside	  other	  modifications	  recommended	  by	  the	  MID	  board.	  Because	  of	  the	  high	  price	  it	  was	  offering	  and	  because	  of	  the	  need	  for	  water	  in	  drought	  years,	  the	  SFPUC	  was	  not	  willing	  to	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budge	  on	  its	  insistence	  for	  the	  first	  right	  of	  refusal,	  according	  to	  a	  key	  negotiator	  from	  the	  SFPUC.148	  When	  the	  SFPUC	  informed	  the	  MID	  that	  it	  would	  not	  negotiate	  on	  the	  first	  right	  of	  refusal,	  Larry	  Byrd	  called	  it	  “the	  game	  breaker.”149	  Above	  all	  else,	  he	  cited	  this	  demand	  as	  the	  pivotal	  reason	  the	  water	  transfer	  fell	  through	  when	  interviewed.150	  He	  responded	  in	  September	  2012	  by	  calling	  the	  hasty	  vote	  that	  ultimately	  scuttled	  the	  whole	  deal.	  	   Beyond	  a	  potential	  lawsuit,	  the	  water	  deal	  stoked	  controversy	  because	  it	  aroused	  strong	  antagonism	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  interest	  groups,	  factions,	  and	  individuals.	  One	  respondent	  likened	  it	  to	  a	  revolt,	  and	  another	  called	  it	  turmoil.151	  However	  it	  was	  described,	  the	  pressure	  that	  the	  opposition	  put	  on	  the	  MID	  board	  was	  the	  most	  frequently	  cited	  key	  factor	  in	  interviews.	  Certain	  organizations	  were	  excellent	  at	  mobilizing	  their	  constituents	  and	  making	  their	  disapproval	  felt.	  John	  Duarte,	  the	  area	  farmer	  who	  lost	  the	  MID	  board	  seat	  to	  Larry	  Byrd	  and	  who	  founded	  a	  PAC	  to	  combat	  the	  water	  transfer,	  embodied	  organized.	  In	  an	  interview,	  he	  produced	  numerous	  documents	  and	  records	  tracing	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  MID	  and	  the	  story	  of	  the	  proposed	  water	  transfer.	  When	  asked	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  deal	  fell	  through,	  Duarte	  said	  simply,	  “We	  made	  it	  too	  hot”—referring	  to	  the	  pressure	  the	  PAC	  created	  on	  the	  board,	  the	  momentum	  behind	  its	  campaign	  for	  a	  special	  election,	  and	  the	  awareness	  it	  spread	  to	  other	  potential	  critics.152	  The	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  came	  out	  publically	  against	  the	  drafted	  arrangement,	  composing	  an	  editorial	  in	  the	  local	  paper	  to	  highlight	  its	  main	  concerns,	  as	  did	  the	  Stanislaus	  Taxpayers	  Association.	  	  Several	  interviewees	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  potency	  of	  the	  opposition	  was	  not	  necessarily	  due	  to	  the	  number	  of	  voices	  opposing,	  but	  to	  the	  volume	  of	  the	  outcry.	  Ed	  Harrington	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  frankly	  stated,	  “I’m	  not	  sure	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  [of	  opposition].	  There	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was	  a	  very	  vocal	  opposition…	  you	  always	  hear	  from	  the	  same	  five	  people.”153	  Mayor	  Garrad	  Marsh	  reiterated	  this,	  calling	  the	  opposition	  an	  extremely	  vocal	  but	  small	  faction	  of	  people	  and	  citing	  them	  as	  “a	  major	  factor.”154	  	   Though	  not	  as	  vocal,	  advocates	  of	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  did	  exist.	  These	  individuals	  came	  to	  public	  hearings	  and	  penned	  op-­‐eds	  in	  the	  local	  paper	  to	  express	  their	  support	  for	  the	  deal.	  High	  profile	  members	  of	  the	  community,	  such	  as	  the	  school	  board	  president,	  were	  attacked	  for	  publically	  advocating	  the	  deal.	  However,	  no	  stakeholder	  organizations	  publically	  came	  out	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  deal,	  nor	  did	  interested	  individuals	  mobilize	  to	  lobby	  as	  a	  unified	  front	  for	  negotiations	  to	  continue.	  	  	   The	  opposition	  may	  not	  have	  been	  large,	  but	  it	  was	  varied.	  Central	  Valley	  farmers,	  San	  Francisco	  Bay	  Area	  environmentalists,	  rural	  Tea	  Party	  organizations,	  city	  of	  Modesto	  residents	  (including	  city	  councilmembers),	  and	  an	  MID	  board	  member	  all	  opposed	  the	  transfer.	  So	  just	  what	  was	  it	  about	  this	  transfer	  that	  united	  such	  disparate	  groups?	  This	  question	  can	  be	  answered	  in	  part	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  third-­‐party	  impacts.	  	  Were	  there	  concerns	  about	  third-­‐party	  impacts,	  as	  are	  commonly	  experienced	  in	  water	  transfers,	  that	  disrupted	  this	  particular	  deal?	  	   Third-­‐party	  impacts	  are	  those	  effects,	  typically	  negative,	  that	  a	  water	  transfer	  inflicts	  upon	  those	  not	  directly	  engaged	  in	  the	  arrangement.	  These	  effects	  can	  generally	  be	  categorized	  as	  environmental,	  social,	  and	  economic.	  The	  most	  common	  impacts	  occur	  when	  one	  water	  rights	  holder	  sells	  water	  to	  another,	  and	  the	  seller	  accounts	  for	  the	  reduced	  water	  by	  either	  pumping	  additional	  groundwater	  or	  cutting	  back	  on	  a	  productive	  activity	  (often	  by	  fallowing	  fields),	  thereby	  having	  a	  ripple	  effect	  on	  the	  local	  economy.	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   Possible	  environmental	  changes	  from	  water	  transfers	  draw	  particular	  scrutiny.	  In	  this	  particular	  instance,	  environmental	  organizations	  led	  by	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  were	  most	  concerned	  about	  the	  stretch	  of	  river	  between	  the	  SFPUC	  point	  of	  diversion	  at	  its	  upstream	  reservoir	  and	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  MID	  would	  make	  the	  river	  whole	  again,	  36	  miles	  downstream	  (see	  Figure	  11).	  Reduced	  flows	  for	  this	  36-­‐mile	  stretch	  caused	  an	  alarm	  
because	  the	  river	  already	  suffered	  from	  diminished	  water	  quality,	  faltering	  salmon	  counts,	  and	  other	  indicators	  of	  poor	  ecological	  health.155	  For	  this	  reason,	  environmentalists	  were	  determined	  to	  fight	  the	  transfer.	  The	  TRT	  pressured	  the	  SFPUC	  into	  hiring	  a	  private	  firm	  to	  investigate	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  the	  transfer	  on	  the	  36-­‐mile	  portion	  of	  the	  river.	  The	  firm	  determined	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  significant	  harm	  by	  the	  transfer,	  and	  the	  SFPUC	  proceeded.	  Though	  the	  TRT	  continued	  to	  attend	  public	  hearings,	  develop	  an	  
Figure	  11:	  SFPUC’s	  diversion	  point	  on	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  is	  upstream	  from	  the	  MID	  (Source:	  MID)	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internet	  campaign	  against	  the	  transfer,	  and	  spread	  awareness	  among	  environmental	  allies,	  it	  conceded	  that	  it	  likely	  had	  a	  minimal	  impact	  on	  the	  eventual	  outcome	  of	  the	  deal.156	  	   For	  Modesto	  area	  farmers,	  environmental	  issues	  posed	  a	  possible	  threat	  to	  their	  livelihood,	  which	  this	  water	  transfer	  could	  compound.	  Concerns	  regarding	  the	  health	  of	  rivers,	  endangered	  species,	  and	  the	  water	  system	  at	  large	  had	  prompted	  action	  by	  the	  state	  government.	  Most	  infamous	  were	  the	  cutbacks	  in	  aqueduct	  deliveries	  to	  Central	  Valley	  farmers	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  the	  extinction	  of	  an	  endangered	  fish	  species	  in	  the	  Sacramento-­‐San	  Joaquin	  Delta.	  Stanislaus	  County	  farmers	  believed	  further	  actions	  by	  the	  government,	  including	  the	  proposed	  San	  Joaquin	  River	  Instream	  Flow	  Standards	  and	  the	  San	  Joaquin	  River	  Restoration	  Program,	  might	  force	  the	  MID	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  water	  it	  diverts	  from	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  (a	  tributary	  of	  the	  San	  Joaquin).	  On	  behalf	  of	  Modesto	  farmers,	  the	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  therefore	  argued	  against	  transferring	  water	  out	  of	  the	  district.	  With	  regulators	  potentially	  demanding	  more	  water	  in	  the	  future	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  environment—combined	  with	  the	  very	  real	  possibility	  of	  diminished	  river	  flows	  due	  to	  a	  changing	  climate—the	  Farm	  Bureau	  doubted	  MID’s	  ability	  to	  deliver	  its	  full	  water	  allotments	  to	  farmers	  should	  it	  sign	  a	  50-­‐year	  contract	  with	  the	  SFPUC.157	  A	  complex	  argument	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  hypotheticals,	  it	  nonetheless	  captured	  a	  concern	  of	  a	  possible	  impact	  on	  the	  region’s	  agricultural	  economy.	  Indeed,	  third	  parties	  and	  their	  representatives	  could	  only	  speculate	  as	  to	  the	  impacts	  from	  this	  hypothetical	  transfer.	  Unlike	  many	  traditional	  water	  transfers,	  in	  which	  the	  water	  sold	  must	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  usage	  changes	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  seller,	  this	  deal	  was	  not	  supposed	  to	  disrupt	  the	  deliveries	  the	  MID	  provided	  to	  its	  customer	  base	  (a	  claim	  disputed	  by	  many	  critics).	  Theoretically	  all	  MID	  customers	  could	  continue	  to	  use	  water	  as	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they	  already	  did,	  whether	  it	  was	  farmers	  irrigating,	  Modesto	  businesses	  consuming	  water	  at	  work,	  or	  residents	  using	  water	  at	  home.	  The	  real	  debate	  centered	  around	  what	  would	  occur	  during	  a	  drought.	  The	  MID	  promised	  it	  would	  have	  enough	  water	  to	  fulfill	  its	  obligations	  to	  its	  customers	  in	  dry	  years	  even	  after	  the	  additional	  2	  mgd	  transferred	  to	  the	  SFPUC.158	  However,	  skeptics	  doubted	  these	  water	  estimates,	  with	  vocal	  opponents	  such	  as	  John	  Duarte	  providing	  estimates	  of	  their	  own	  revealing	  otherwise.159	  What	  could	  not	  be	  denied	  was	  a	  line	  in	  the	  contract	  promising	  San	  Francisco	  first	  right	  of	  refusal,	  meaning	  it	  received	  its	  full	  allotment	  even	  if	  other	  MID	  users	  experienced	  cutbacks	  in	  exceptionally	  dry	  years.	  This	  scenario,	  which	  ranged	  from	  uncommon	  to	  highly	  unlikely,	  nonetheless	  animated	  many	  of	  MID’s	  critics.	  Nonetheless,	  should	  the	  MID	  fail	  to	  deliver	  its	  contractual	  amount	  to	  the	  City	  of	  Modesto	  and	  require	  cutbacks	  to	  all	  its	  users—agricultural	  and	  urban	  alike—while	  still	  delivering	  all	  of	  the	  SFPUC’s	  2	  mgd,	  there	  could	  theoretically	  be	  environmental,	  social,	  and	  economic	  impacts.II	  The	  city	  of	  Modesto	  proposed	  variations	  to	  the	  SFPUC’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  first	  right	  of	  refusal,	  such	  as	  proportional	  cutbacks	  by	  all	  parties,	  but	  the	  SFPUC	  felt	  drought	  security	  was	  the	  whole	  crux	  of	  the	  agreement.160	  Both	  Larry	  Byrd	  of	  the	  MID	  and	  Steve	  Ritchie	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  concurred	  that	  this	  was	  a	  crucial	  sticking	  point	  in	  the	  negotiations.161162	  Hypothetically	  speaking,	  if	  the	  MID	  reduced	  water	  deliveries	  to	  its	  customers-­‐-­‐while	  still	  providing	  all	  2	  mgd	  to	  the	  SFPUC-­‐-­‐in	  a	  dry	  year,	  its	  customers	  might	  respond	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  The	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  which	  has	  begun	  to	  replenish	  its	  aquifers	  after	  years	  of	  severely	  overtapping	  its	  groundwater,	  could	  again	  return	  to	  groundwater	  pumping.163	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  II	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  extreme	  drought	  scenarios,	  there	  could	  be	  cutbacks	  across	  all	  sectors	  by	  MID,	  with	  or	  without	  the	  2	  mgd	  transferred.	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Farmers	  with	  access	  to	  the	  aquifer	  could	  do	  the	  same,	  opting	  to	  increase	  groundwater	  withdrawals	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  deficit	  in	  surface	  water	  delivery	  during	  the	  dry	  year.	  The	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  cited	  this	  as	  another	  reason	  for	  its	  opposition	  to	  proposed	  transfer,	  as	  the	  MID	  could	  not	  ensure	  against	  increased	  groundwater	  demand.164	  Though	  MID	  users	  would	  not	  experience	  any	  absolute	  water	  shortage,	  increased	  pumping	  of	  groundwater	  for	  an	  extended	  time	  can	  have	  significant	  environmental	  impacts.	  Withdrawing	  groundwater	  faster	  than	  it	  can	  recharge	  lowers	  the	  water	  table,	  eventually	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  existing	  water	  pumps;	  this	  jeopardizes	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  water	  and	  can	  lead	  to	  scarcity.	  Over	  time	  the	  porous	  aquifer	  layers	  can	  compact,	  making	  recharge	  even	  more	  difficult	  (and	  sometimes	  causing	  disastrous	  land	  subsidence),	  thereby	  having	  long-­‐term	  implications	  for	  the	  local	  water	  supply.165	  If	  water	  deliveries	  by	  the	  MID	  were	  reduced	  to	  its	  customers	  and	  groundwater	  was	  not	  pumped	  to	  account	  for	  the	  difference,	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  impacts	  could	  transpire.	  Farmers	  without	  their	  regular	  volume	  of	  water	  might	  have	  to	  fallow	  fields	  and	  reduce	  production,	  having	  a	  ripple	  effect	  on	  the	  local,	  agriculture-­‐based	  economy.	  City	  users	  in	  Modesto	  might	  be	  forced	  to	  undertake	  conservation	  measures	  that	  would	  restrict	  their	  regular	  water	  use.	  These	  cutbacks	  would	  occur	  while	  the	  SFPUC	  customers	  in	  the	  Bay	  Area	  would	  not	  see	  any	  reductions	  in	  their	  deliveries.	  Some	  residents	  felt	  they	  were	  already	  restricted	  in	  their	  usage,	  and	  questioned	  why	  they	  would	  have	  to	  reduce	  water	  usage	  while	  Bay	  Area	  residents	  would	  not,	  raising	  issues	  of	  equity.166	  Bay	  Area	  environmentalists	  also	  noted	  an	  inequitable	  economic	  impact	  of	  the	  transfer.	  The	  SFPUC	  would	  pay	  for	  the	  transfer	  every	  year	  whether	  it	  used	  the	  water	  or	  not.	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  transfer	  would	  be	  shared	  by	  SFPUC	  customers	  in	  San	  Francisco	  and	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wholesale	  customers	  throughout	  the	  Bay	  Area	  Water	  Supply	  and	  Conservation	  Agency,	  with	  San	  Franciscans	  paying	  about	  a	  third	  of	  the	  $15	  million	  over	  10	  years.167	  However,	  due	  to	  reduced	  demand,	  continued	  conservation	  efforts,	  and	  drought	  calculation	  formulas,	  San	  Francisco	  would	  very	  likely	  use	  little	  of	  the	  transferred	  water	  in	  a	  drought,	  while	  the	  BAWSCA	  users	  would	  consume	  the	  vast	  majority.168	  San	  Franciscans	  would	  therefore	  subsidize	  much	  of	  the	  water	  used	  by	  BAWSCA	  retail	  customers.	  This	  was	  unfair	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  environmentalists	  because	  San	  Francisco	  did	  a	  superb	  job	  of	  using	  water	  efficiently—85.6	  gallons	  per	  capita	  daily169—while	  BAWSCA	  users	  consumed	  far	  more.170	  The	  argument	  was	  that	  if	  BAWSCA	  users	  consumed	  water	  more	  efficiently,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  seek	  additional	  water	  supply	  through	  transfers	  (subsidized	  mostly	  by	  San	  Francisco)	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Some	  critics	  looked	  at	  the	  implications	  further	  down	  the	  line	  of	  selling	  water	  to	  San	  Francisco.	  They	  brought	  up	  a	  fear	  that	  that	  surfaces	  in	  other	  third-­‐party	  impact	  cases:	  the	  loss	  of	  water	  rights.	  “Don’t	  sell	  our	  water,	  and	  don’t	  sell	  our	  grandchildren’s	  water	  rights,”	  pleaded	  one	  Modesto	  resident.171	  Though	  the	  MID	  and	  SFPUC	  assured	  users	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  transfer	  of	  rights,	  and	  that	  selling	  water	  to	  a	  city	  qualified	  as	  a	  beneficial	  use,	  some	  skeptics	  feared	  this	  deal	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  MID	  claims	  to	  the	  water.	  They	  wondered	  if	  a	  proposed	  water	  transfer	  signaled	  to	  government	  agencies	  like	  the	  Department	  of	  Fish	  and	  Wildlife—often	  looking	  to	  improve	  river	  conditions	  through	  increased	  flow—that	  the	  MID	  had	  water	  it	  did	  not	  need,	  which	  would	  be	  forfeited	  to	  the	  state	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  not	  being	  put	  to	  beneficial	  use.172	  This	  was	  not	  likely,	  as	  water	  expert	  Ellen	  Hanak	  explained,	  because	  water—but	  not	  the	  right—would	  be	  transferred	  in	  this	  proposal,	  and	  transferring	  water	  qualified	  as	  a	  beneficial	  use.173	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Third-­‐party	  impacts	  include	  not	  only	  activities	  that	  must	  be	  scaled	  back	  or	  forfeited,	  but	  future	  opportunities	  lost.	  Some	  farmers	  opposed	  the	  water	  transfer	  not	  simply	  because	  it	  might	  force	  reductions	  in	  surface	  water	  deliveries	  during	  dry	  years,	  but	  because	  it	  restricted	  the	  possibility	  for	  expanding	  the	  agricultural	  economy	  of	  the	  area.	  Even	  if	  the	  MID	  could	  no	  longer	  annex	  additional	  acreage	  to	  serve	  with	  its	  water	  due	  to	  limitations	  from	  the	  Raker	  Act,	  they	  felt	  it	  should	  sell	  the	  water	  to	  neighboring	  farmers	  or	  irrigation	  districts	  instead	  of	  to	  San	  Francisco.174	  That	  the	  MID	  deemed	  such	  transactions	  neither	  cost-­‐effective	  nor	  presently	  feasible	  due	  to	  infrastructure	  constraints	  was	  of	  little	  importance.175	  To	  local	  farmers,	  keeping	  the	  water	  within	  the	  greater	  river	  basin	  and	  in	  the	  farm	  economy	  could	  help	  grow	  the	  regional	  economy	  and	  bring	  additional	  industry	  and	  jobs	  connected	  to	  a	  thriving	  agricultural	  sector	  (and	  prevent	  the	  economic	  decline	  occurring	  west	  of	  Modesto	  where	  water	  reductions	  were	  felt	  hardest).176	  Relaying	  a	  sentiment	  of	  farmers	  he	  spoke	  to,	  reporter	  John	  Holland	  said	  in	  an	  interview	  that	  people	  began	  to	  feel,	  after	  the	  recent	  economic	  downturn,	  agriculture	  should	  remain	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Modesto	  economy.177	  Thus,	  agriculturalists	  like	  John	  Duarte	  did	  not	  necessarily	  oppose	  water	  transfers	  in	  general,	  but	  wanted	  to	  see	  the	  water	  remain	  in	  the	  region.	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Figure	  12:	  Sign	  welcoming	  visitors	  to	  downtown	  Modesto	  (Source:	  rocor178)	  
	  Was	  this	  deal	  complicated	  by	  factors	  aside	  from	  third-­‐party	  impacts?	  	   Keeping	  the	  MID	  water	  within	  the	  greater	  region	  had	  an	  economic	  foundation,	  but	  it	  also	  touched	  on	  a	  more	  elemental	  reason	  for	  opposing	  the	  water	  transfer.	  Modestans	  and	  those	  in	  the	  area	  identified	  with	  water,	  and	  with	  farming.	  After	  all,	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  was	  the	  earliest	  special	  district	  in	  California	  (along	  with	  the	  TID),	  formed	  to	  provide	  reliable	  irrigation	  water	  for	  area	  farmers.179	  The	  district	  acquired	  early	  appropriative	  water	  rights	  preceding	  the	  1913	  Water	  Commission	  Act,	  and	  these	  were	  further	  solidified	  and	  protected	  with	  later	  agreements.	  In	  a	  modern	  riparian	  gesture,	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Modestans	  were	  confirming	  a	  time-­‐honored	  tradition	  of	  connecting	  the	  use	  of	  water	  to	  its	  location—and	  recoiling	  when	  the	  water	  did	  not	  “go	  with	  the	  land.”	  John	  Holland	  noted	  that	  locals	  felt	  water	  was	  something	  precious	  not	  to	  be	  fooled	  with,	  and	  that	  it	  had	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  culture.180	  After	  all,	  visitors	  to	  downtown	  Modesto	  are	  greeted	  by	  a	  sign	  that	  reads:	  “WATER	  WEALTH	  CONTENTMENT	  HEALTH”	  (see	  Figure	  12),	  and	  much	  of	  the	  history	  and	  identity	  of	  Modesto	  stems	  from	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  it	  sits	  next	  to.	  Ed	  Harrington	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  identified	  the	  feeling	  as:	  “Water	  is	  what	  makes	  us,”181	  and	  this	  eventually	  became	  a	  big	  hurdle	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process	  when	  many	  people	  were	  unwilling	  to	  support	  a	  sale	  of	  water	  in	  any	  fashion.	  	   It	  is	  an	  important	  consideration,	  because	  to	  an	  observer	  removed	  from	  the	  process,	  the	  uproar	  over	  the	  transfer	  could	  appear	  quite	  out	  of	  proportion	  to	  the	  relatively	  small	  amount	  of	  water	  involved.	  The	  2	  million	  gallons	  per	  day	  transferred,	  equaling	  2,240	  acre-­‐feet	  (af)	  of	  water	  per	  year,	  was	  roughly	  1.6	  percent	  of	  the	  MID’s	  deliveries,	  and	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  the	  river’s	  annual	  flow.182	  MID	  board	  president	  Tom	  Von	  Groningen	  called	  it	  “literally	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  bucket.”183	  Realistic	  calculations	  from	  both	  sides	  agreed	  that	  the	  MID	  should	  be	  able	  to	  satisfy	  all	  its	  customers	  while	  still	  transferring	  2	  mgd	  to	  the	  SFPUC.	  Even	  Peter	  Drekmeier	  of	  the	  TRT	  admitted	  that	  the	  initial	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  was	  a	  relatively	  small	  amount	  to	  divert	  from	  the	  river.184	  However,	  Drekmeier	  and	  other	  opponents	  of	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  understood	  the	  importance	  of	  nipping	  this	  deal	  in	  the	  bud.	  Because	  behind	  this	  small	  2,240	  af	  transfer	  lurked	  a	  much	  greater	  25,000	  af	  transfer	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  Within	  the	  proposed	  contract	  for	  the	  initial	  2,240	  af	  transfer	  was	  language	  directing	  the	  two	  parties	  to	  begin	  consideration	  of	  a	  larger	  future	  transfer.185	  Some	  saw	  the	  first	  transfer	  as	  a	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foot	  in	  the	  door,	  or	  as	  one	  Modesto	  resident	  put	  it,	  “the	  camel’s	  nose	  under	  the	  tent.”186	  The	  ramifications	  and	  potential	  impacts	  of	  this	  25,000	  af	  transfer	  were	  what	  truly	  frightened	  those	  close	  to	  the	  issue.	  John	  Duarte,	  Larry	  Byrd,	  and	  other	  opponents	  familiar	  with	  the	  MID	  water	  supply	  disputed	  the	  estimates	  and	  charts	  produced	  by	  the	  MID	  explaining	  how	  it	  could	  deliver	  both	  the	  2,240	  af	  initially	  and	  then	  the	  25,000	  af	  in	  the	  future.187	  With	  over	  25,000	  af	  promised	  to	  San	  Francisco,	  many	  felt	  economic,	  environmental,	  and	  social	  impacts	  on	  Modesto	  were	  unavoidable.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  SFPUC,	  the	  two	  transfers	  were	  not	  one	  and	  the	  same,	  and	  a	  larger	  transfer	  would	  require	  years	  of	  environmental	  impact	  reviews	  and	  assessments—to	  address	  many	  of	  the	  opponents’	  concerns—before	  it	  could	  take	  place.	  They	  felt	  the	  two	  transfers	  had	  unfairly	  been	  conflated	  by	  those	  opposed	  to	  selling	  any	  water	  to	  San	  Francisco	  and	  it	  became	  impossible	  to	  simply	  negotiate	  for	  the	  initial	  2,240	  af	  amount.188	  	  	   Many	  of	  the	  deal’s	  opponents	  feared	  that	  the	  San	  Francisco	  negotiators	  would	  get	  the	  best	  of	  their	  Modesto	  counterparts	  in	  whatever	  water	  deal	  was	  brokered.	  This	  reflected	  a	  suspicion	  towards	  San	  Francisco,	  but	  even	  more	  so	  a	  local	  mistrust	  and	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  MID	  that	  had	  developed	  in	  recent	  years	  amidst	  its	  customers.	  Judy	  Sly	  called	  this	  mistrust	  of	  the	  MID	  the	  greatest	  factor	  in	  the	  negotiations’	  collapse.189	  When	  vocalizing	  opposition	  to	  the	  transfer,	  MID	  customers	  also	  decried	  the	  agency’s	  “tyranny”	  and	  accused	  it	  of	  years	  of	  mismanagement,	  which	  drove	  it	  to	  a	  debt	  this	  water	  transfer	  was	  being	  used	  to	  fill.190	  Citizens,	  along	  with	  board	  member	  Larry	  Byrd,	  also	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  MID	  management	  handled	  the	  water	  transfer	  negotiations.	  Byrd	  vocalized	  his	  disgust	  with	  the	  MID	  management’s	  approach	  by	  likening	  it	  to	  a	  “propaganda”	  campaign,	  rather	  than	  an	  open	  dialogue	  with	  the	  public.191	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In	  addition	  to	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  estimates	  of	  surplus	  water	  available	  for	  transfer,	  both	  John	  Duarte	  and	  Larry	  Byrd	  believed	  the	  cost	  projections	  for	  necessary	  infrastructure	  upgrades	  were	  overstated.192	  The	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  felt	  similarly,	  wanting	  to	  explore	  exactly	  which	  expenditures	  were	  truly	  necessary	  and	  whether	  less	  expensive	  options	  might	  be	  available;	  they	  might	  then	  consider	  accepting	  higher	  water	  rates	  to	  cover	  such	  costs.193	  	  	   In	  dealing	  with	  San	  Francisco,	  MID	  customers	  dreaded	  the	  agency	  would	  somehow	  lose	  their	  water	  permanently.	  These	  were	  some	  of	  the	  earliest	  water	  rights	  in	  California,	  which	  Modestans	  protected	  according	  to	  both	  a	  “riparian”	  tradition	  and	  with	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  increasing	  demand	  for	  water	  security	  in	  the	  West.	  As	  previously	  noted,	  they	  feared	  either	  transferring	  water	  rights	  that	  could	  never	  be	  reacquired,	  or	  they	  feared	  selling	  water	  to	  a	  wealthy	  party	  that	  they	  could	  never	  compete	  with.194	  And	  though	  government	  agencies	  would	  likely	  not	  confiscate	  MID	  water	  rights	  simply	  for	  attempting	  transfer	  negotiations,	  there	  was	  still	  the	  matter	  of	  FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  to	  consider.	  Transferring	  water	  to	  San	  Francisco	  might	  embolden	  regulators	  to	  request	  greater	  releases	  from	  the	  Don	  Pedro	  Reservoir	  because	  the	  MID	  was	  demonstrating	  it	  had	  a	  surplus,	  went	  the	  argument.195	  After	  the	  re-­‐licensing	  process,	  if	  the	  MID	  did	  in	  fact	  have	  to	  increase	  releases	  for	  instream	  flows,	  critics	  argued	  that	  the	  MID	  would	  then	  want	  to	  make	  use	  of	  its	  estimated	  “surplus,”	  rather	  than	  transferring	  it	  beforehand.	  	  	   So	  much	  of	  the	  opposition	  appeared	  to	  stem	  from	  the	  basic	  principle	  that	  MID	  water	  should	  remain	  within	  the	  district	  that	  one	  might	  question	  whether	  there	  were	  any	  specific	  issues	  with	  the	  technical	  language	  of	  the	  contract.	  Larry	  Byrd	  had	  several.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  previously	  discussed	  first	  right	  of	  refusal	  and	  the	  MID’s	  inability	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  contract,	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Byrd	  objected	  to	  the	  length	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  MID	  to	  sell	  water	  to	  other	  districts,	  the	  right	  of	  San	  Francisco	  to	  terminate	  the	  agreement	  at	  any	  time,	  and	  a	  clause	  stating	  that	  “MID	  will	  be	  solely	  responsible	  for	  all	  costs,	  compliance	  with	  all	  laws,	  agreements	  with	  third	  parties,	  liability	  and	  in	  all	  other	  respects	  to	  make	  water	  available	  for	  transfer	  under	  this	  Agreement”	  (Section	  II.C1	  (ii)	  2012).196	  These	  issues	  “stuck	  in	  my	  craw,”	  as	  Byrd	  put	  it.197	  As	  noted	  by	  outside	  observers,	  Byrd	  wielded	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  influence	  with	  the	  board,	  and	  his	  obstinacy	  with	  these	  half-­‐dozen	  points	  forced	  the	  MID	  management	  to	  continuously	  return	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table.198	  	  	   If	  these	  issues	  had	  been	  dealt	  with,	  could	  Byrd	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  board	  have	  accepted	  the	  proposal?	  In	  an	  interview,	  he	  said	  that	  he	  would	  have	  considered	  it,	  and	  he	  is	  certain	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  board	  would	  have	  voted	  in	  favor.199	  Certainly	  if	  he	  had	  relented	  in	  his	  opposition,	  other	  board	  members	  would	  have	  found	  it	  easier	  to	  support	  the	  transfer.	  When	  pressed	  about	  how	  he	  would	  have	  voted,	  had	  all	  of	  his	  conditions	  been	  met,	  he	  replied,	  “I	  can’t	  answer	  that,	  I	  don’t	  know,”	  though	  he	  was	  certain	  the	  SFPUC	  was	  not	  going	  to	  budge	  from	  certain	  demands.200	  Gauging	  by	  the	  fervor	  with	  which	  he	  opposed	  the	  transfer—attempting	  to	  terminate	  talks	  back	  in	  January	  and	  not	  relenting	  until	  he	  finally	  got	  the	  desired	  result	  in	  September—it	  is	  likely	  that	  Byrd	  would	  have	  contested	  the	  transfer	  in	  any	  form.	  The	  same	  connection	  to	  water	  felt	  by	  so	  many	  Modestans	  resonated	  with	  Byrd,	  who	  said,	  “That’s	  the	  most	  precious	  commodity	  we	  have.	  There’s	  no	  question.	  That’s	  what	  makes	  this	  whole	  county,	  this	  whole	  San	  Joaquin	  Valley,	  tick.”201	  	   In	  the	  eyes	  of	  at	  least	  one	  observer,	  this	  sentiment	  ultimately	  doomed	  the	  deal	  between	  the	  two	  agencies.	  When	  asked	  to	  identify	  key	  factors	  that	  scuttled	  the	  deal,	  former	  SFPUC	  GM	  Ed	  Harrington	  suggested,	  “That	  visceral,	  much	  more	  emotional	  response:	  ‘Oh	  my	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god,	  some	  one	  is	  taking	  our	  water’	  is	  a	  huge	  thing	  for	  people,	  and	  they	  weren’t	  willing	  or	  able	  to	  overcome	  that.	  And	  I	  can	  understand	  that.”202	  Though	  this	  sentiment	  cannot	  fully	  explain	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  transfer,	  its	  importance	  should	  certainly	  not	  be	  discounted.	  	  
One	  explanation:	  Spheres	  of	  Conflict	  	   After	  combing	  through	  the	  explanations	  provided	  by	  interviewees,	  the	  chronicled	  events,	  and	  the	  data	  compiled,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  my	  own	  conclusion	  as	  to	  why	  the	  transfer	  ultimately	  did	  not	  succeed.	  When	  discussions	  began	  between	  staff	  of	  the	  two	  water	  agencies,	  there	  was	  great	  optimism	  that	  a	  deal	  could	  be	  completed.	  However,	  the	  negotiation	  process	  soon	  grew	  complex	  as	  additional	  stakeholders	  and	  actors	  became	  involved.	  The	  various	  goals,	  personalities,	  and	  approaches	  of	  competing	  interests	  created	  intense	  points	  of	  conflict.	  These	  conflicts	  occurred	  within	  three	  spheres:	  within	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  its	  contractual	  partners,	  and	  from	  external	  third	  parties	  combatting	  the	  MID.	  Had	  the	  MID	  been	  able	  to	  manage	  and	  resolve	  issues	  stemming	  from	  one	  or	  even	  two	  of	  these	  spheres,	  a	  deal	  may	  have	  been	  possible;	  but	  conflict	  brewing	  in	  all	  three	  spelled	  disaster	  for	  any	  agreement.	  	  Internal	  conflicts	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  when	  the	  board	  voted	  to	  suspend	  the	  negotiations,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  fractures	  had	  developed	  between	  various	  board	  members	  and	  that	  a	  severe	  rift	  existed	  between	  the	  board	  and	  MID	  management.	  When	  talks	  began	  in	  mid-­‐2011,	  MID	  management	  staff	  went	  to	  negotiate	  a	  water	  deal	  with	  San	  Francisco	  with	  the	  support	  of	  their	  board,	  but	  the	  elections	  of	  Larry	  Byrd	  and	  Nick	  Blom	  in	  November	  irrevocably	  altered	  the	  board	  dynamics.	  Byrd	  fulfilled	  promises	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail	  to	  combat	  the	  proposed	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transfer,	  creating	  tension	  within	  the	  board	  by	  dissenting	  from	  his	  four	  colleagues	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  halt	  negotiations	  in	  January	  2012.	  Nick	  Blom,	  who	  had	  wavered	  between	  opposing	  and	  supporting	  the	  deal,	  likely	  felt	  pressure	  from	  Byrd,	  but	  also	  expressed	  specific	  issues	  with	  the	  deal	  and	  eventually	  sided	  against	  it.	  A	  division	  among	  the	  board	  had	  become	  apparent,	  and	  the	  board	  president	  was	  unable	  to	  lead	  them	  to	  consensus.203	  This	  left	  the	  MID	  management	  staff	  in	  the	  uncomfortable	  position	  of	  attempting	  to	  broker	  a	  deal	  which	  it	  could	  not	  be	  certain	  its	  own	  board	  would	  approve,	  and	  it	  had	  to	  relay	  requests	  for	  revisions	  to	  the	  contract	  by	  individual	  board	  members	  to	  the	  SFPUC.	  Larry	  Byrd	  had	  meanwhile	  grown	  increasingly	  distrustful	  and	  antagonistic	  towards	  the	  MID	  staff	  attempting	  to	  execute	  the	  deal,	  accusing	  them	  of	  spreading	  propaganda	  and	  calling	  them	  out	  publically	  in	  the	  local	  paper.	  When	  MID	  staff	  could	  not	  get	  the	  SFPUC	  to	  revise	  the	  drafted	  contract	  to	  accommodate	  his	  various	  demands,	  it	  provided	  him	  with	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  to	  terminate	  the	  talks.	  	  Contractual	  conflicts	  	   Even	  if	  there	  had	  been	  complete	  harmony	  within	  the	  MID,	  the	  agency	  would	  have	  still	  have	  faced	  a	  significant	  obstacle	  when	  attempting	  to	  sell	  water	  to	  the	  SFPUC.	  The	  2005	  contract	  the	  MID	  had	  signed	  with	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  contained	  language	  that	  appeared	  to	  directly	  prevent	  the	  MID	  from	  transferring	  water	  outside	  the	  district’s	  boundaries.204	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  low	  likelihood	  that	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  of	  2	  mgd	  would	  ever	  imperil	  the	  MID	  supply	  of	  treated	  water	  to	  the	  city,	  Modesto	  officials	  nonetheless	  threatened	  legal	  action.	  Such	  threats	  likely	  influenced	  board	  members	  on	  the	  fence,	  particularly	  Nick	  Blom	  and	  the	  aging	  Paul	  Warda,	  who	  sought	  to	  avoid	  controversy	  in	  the	  last	  year	  of	  his	  term	  and	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provided	  the	  key	  swing	  vote.205	  Importantly,	  no	  lawsuit	  was	  ever	  filed	  by	  Modesto,	  and	  they	  were	  even	  willing	  to	  amend	  their	  agreement	  with	  MID	  to	  allow	  the	  transfer	  to	  go	  through,	  as	  long	  as	  certain	  conditions	  were	  met.	  Such	  conditions	  would	  have	  involved	  altering	  parts	  of	  the	  newly	  drafted	  contract	  the	  SFPUC	  held	  dear—namely	  the	  first	  right	  of	  refusal	  for	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  guarantees	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  reductions	  in	  delivery	  in	  drought	  years.	  Thus,	  the	  two	  entities	  the	  MID	  was	  dealing	  with—the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  and	  the	  SFPUC—could	  not	  reach	  accord	  on	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  transfer,	  which	  Larry	  Byrd	  leveraged	  to	  vote	  on	  terminating	  the	  negotiations.	  	  Third-­‐party	  conflicts	  	   As	  reported	  in	  interviews,	  opposition	  from	  interest	  groups	  outside	  the	  negotiations	  also	  disrupted	  the	  deal.	  One	  can	  speculate	  as	  to	  whether	  threats	  by	  the	  Stanislaus	  Taxpayers	  Association	  to	  sue	  the	  MID	  or	  the	  StopMIDinsanity.com	  campaign	  to	  hold	  a	  special	  election	  to	  block	  the	  sale	  had	  any	  merit.	  One	  can	  likewise	  question	  whether	  pleas	  from	  environmentalists	  regarding	  the	  health	  of	  the	  river	  or	  concerns	  by	  Modestans	  about	  permanently	  losing	  water	  rights	  to	  San	  Francisco	  had	  any	  sway	  over	  the	  MID	  board.	  The	  conclusion	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  these	  acts	  in	  isolation	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  ultimate	  collapse	  of	  the	  deal.	  But	  when	  this	  amalgamation	  of	  concerns	  snowballed	  into	  a	  chorus	  of	  angry	  citizens,	  farmers,	  environmentalists,	  Tea	  Partiers,	  civic	  leaders	  and	  more,	  it	  became	  a	  powerful	  lobby	  that	  the	  MID	  could	  not	  ignore.	  Though	  likely	  not	  influential	  enough	  on	  its	  own	  to	  stymie	  the	  deal,	  this	  adamant	  opposition	  provided	  Larry	  Byrd	  with	  causes	  and	  momentum	  as	  he	  persistently	  lobbied	  each	  board	  member	  to	  join	  him	  in	  voting	  against	  the	  proposed	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer.	  
	  	   81	  
	  
Summary	  Ultimately,	  Larry	  Byrd	  and	  other	  antagonists	  of	  the	  water	  deal	  succeeded	  in	  preventing	  an	  agreement	  from	  ever	  being	  finalized	  between	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID.	  Why	  the	  MID	  board	  voted	  to	  suspend	  negotiations	  before	  they	  arrived	  at	  this	  point	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis.	  While	  individuals	  familiar	  with	  the	  episode	  are	  unable	  to	  fully	  agree	  on	  the	  factors	  that	  brought	  about	  the	  deal’s	  termination,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  shed	  light	  on	  a	  possible	  theory	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  negotiation.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  failure	  will	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  CONCLUSION	  	  	   The	  MID	  board	  unanimously	  voted	  to	  suspend	  negotiations	  between	  MID	  management	  and	  the	  SFPUC	  on	  September	  18,	  2012.	  Talks	  have	  not	  resumed	  between	  the	  two	  parties,	  nor	  do	  those	  within	  or	  without	  the	  negotiations	  expect	  them	  to	  anytime	  soon,	  and	  thus	  a	  direct	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  between	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  is	  effectively	  off	  the	  table.	  What	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  the	  two	  parties	  going	  forward,	  and	  what	  can	  they—as	  well	  as	  others	  considering	  future	  water	  transactions—learn	  from	  this	  case?	  This	  thesis	  will	  conclude	  by	  pursuing	  these	  inquiries.	  	  Future	  for	  San	  Francisco	  	   San	  Francisco	  may	  not	  be	  planning	  a	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  directly	  through	  the	  MID,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  investigating	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  2	  mgd	  transfer	  with	  a	  water	  district	  adjacent	  to	  the	  MID.	  In	  exploratory	  talks	  with	  the	  Oakdale	  Irrigation	  District	  (OID),	  the	  SFPUC	  would	  purchase	  the	  same	  2	  mgd	  or	  2,240	  af,	  only	  in	  this	  case	  the	  deal	  would	  start	  with	  a	  one	  year	  contract.206	  Coincidentally,	  the	  deal	  would	  need	  to	  involve	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District,	  which	  sits	  between	  the	  OID	  and	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  that	  the	  SFPUC	  would	  again	  divert	  water	  from.	  In	  such	  a	  scenario,	  the	  water	  that	  the	  OID	  would	  transfer	  to	  the	  MID	  to	  account	  for	  water	  diverted	  earlier	  upstream	  by	  the	  SFPUC	  would	  be	  tail	  water	  already	  leaving	  the	  system.207	  Thus,	  the	  MID	  could	  still	  wind	  up	  transferring	  water	  to	  the	  SFPUC,	  only	  it	  would	  be	  receiving	  low	  quality	  water	  in	  return.	  	   The	  SFPUC	  remains	  interested	  in	  both	  a	  2,240	  af	  transfer	  and	  is	  considering	  a	  larger	  25,000	  af	  transfer	  down	  the	  line,	  but	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2012	  it	  was	  holding	  pat.	  With	  drought	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conditions	  receding	  by	  late	  2012	  and	  a	  wet	  year	  upcoming,	  there	  seemed	  no	  need	  to	  rush	  a	  deal	  as	  the	  agency	  would	  be	  flush	  with	  water.208	  Though	  the	  OID	  has	  already	  gone	  public	  about	  its	  discussions	  with	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  the	  item	  has	  been	  included	  on	  the	  board	  agenda	  several	  times,	  at	  the	  moment	  both	  sides	  are	  waiting	  till	  after	  this	  year	  of	  wet	  weather.209	  By	  2013,	  SFPUC	  General	  Manager	  Ed	  Harrington	  had	  stepped	  down,	  but	  the	  SFPUC’s	  key	  water	  negotiators	  remain	  on	  staff	  and	  continue	  to	  investigate	  ways	  to	  secure	  a	  future	  water	  supply.	  	  Future	  for	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  	   Whether	  the	  MID	  takes	  on	  another	  water	  transfer	  in	  the	  near	  future	  is	  not	  clear,	  though	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  it	  would	  involve	  a	  distant	  recipient	  such	  as	  San	  Francisco,	  considering	  the	  backlash	  against	  the	  recent	  proposal.	  In	  interviews,	  staunch	  opponents	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  transfer,	  such	  as	  Larry	  Byrd	  and	  John	  Duarte,	  indicated	  they	  could	  be	  open	  to	  water	  transfers	  within	  their	  region.210	  The	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau,	  while	  coming	  out	  against	  the	  SFPUC	  deal,	  made	  note	  of	  its	  support	  of	  transfers	  that	  met	  its	  list	  of	  criteria.211	  	  	   The	  possibility	  of	  future	  water	  transfers	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  by	  an	  advisory	  committee	  set	  up	  by	  the	  MID.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  committee	  was	  a	  strong	  recommendation	  by	  the	  
Modesto	  Bee	  editorial	  staff,	  and	  the	  MID	  appears	  to	  have	  listened.	  Considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  long	  overdue,	  the	  committee	  will	  investigate	  the	  present	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  MID	  and	  possible	  solutions.212	  Near	  the	  top	  of	  the	  committee’s	  list	  of	  priorities	  will	  be	  deciding	  where	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  millions	  of	  dollars	  still	  required	  for	  infrastructure	  repairs—and	  which	  repairs	  are	  necessary	  to	  pursue—plus	  FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  fees.	  The	  Stanislaus	  County	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Farm	  Bureau	  is	  one	  of	  the	  proposed	  constituents	  of	  the	  water	  advisory	  committee,	  along	  with	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto,	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust,	  and	  the	  Stanislaus	  Taxpayers	  Association	  (among	  others).	  One	  suggestion	  the	  Farm	  Bureau	  has	  already	  put	  forward	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  charging	  MID	  customers	  more	  for	  irrigation	  water	  to	  raise	  revenue.	  	  	   The	  creation	  and	  involvement	  of	  this	  committee	  in	  MID	  decision-­‐making	  could	  signal	  a	  shift	  in	  how	  the	  MID	  operates.	  In	  recent	  years,	  MID	  management	  has	  had	  a	  reputation	  for	  conducting	  its	  operations	  with	  little	  input	  from	  the	  public	  in	  major	  decisions.213	  However,	  this	  modus	  operandi	  may	  be	  changing	  with	  a	  turnover	  in	  personnel.	  General	  Manager	  Allen	  Short,	  who	  attempted	  to	  broker	  the	  controversial	  deal	  with	  the	  SFPUC,	  retired	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2012.	  The	  board	  dynamics	  are	  shifting	  as	  well.	  The	  newest	  two	  members	  of	  the	  MID	  board—Larry	  Byrd	  and	  Nick	  Blom—are	  now	  vice-­‐president	  and	  president	  of	  the	  board,	  respectively.214	  The	  complexion	  of	  the	  board	  will	  continue	  to	  change	  after	  elections	  in	  November	  2013,	  when	  the	  three	  other	  board	  positions	  will	  be	  voted	  upon.	  	  	  
Lessons	  learned	  	  	   Whether	  one	  views	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  proposed	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  transfer	  as	  a	  victory	  for	  aggrieved	  stakeholders	  or	  a	  tragedy	  for	  well-­‐intentioned	  negotiators,	  certain	  lessons	  can	  be	  learned	  from	  the	  episode.	  These	  are	  lessons	  that	  hopefully	  have	  been	  applied	  by	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  as	  they	  look	  ahead	  to	  future	  water	  challenges,	  but	  they	  are	  applicable	  to	  others	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  how	  water	  is	  managed,	  in	  California	  and	  beyond.	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Internal	  management	  
Pursue	  public	  input	  early	  and	  often.	  A	  water	  agency,	  especially	  one	  with	  a	  dedicated	  constituency	  that	  values	  its	  water,	  should	  allow	  for	  public	  input	  before	  drawing	  up	  drafted	  versions	  of	  a	  deal.	  Modestans	  did	  not	  like	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  contract	  appeared	  to	  be	  preliminarily	  drafted	  between	  the	  SFPUC	  and	  MID	  before	  they	  had	  even	  been	  officially	  informed.	  An	  advisory	  committee,	  including	  representatives	  from	  various	  stakeholder	  groups,	  is	  an	  excellent	  way	  to	  involve	  a	  broad	  constituency,	  reduce	  points	  of	  conflict,	  and	  develop	  alternative	  ideas	  when	  considering	  a	  controversial	  water	  decision.	  Having	  an	  insular	  management	  approach,	  in	  which	  a	  public	  agency	  makes	  many	  of	  its	  important	  decisions	  in	  private,	  will	  quickly	  erode	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  people	  it	  is	  seeking	  to	  serve.	  The	  MID	  learned	  this	  lesson	  the	  hard	  way,	  and	  the	  OID	  is	  attempting	  to	  avoid	  these	  mistakes	  by	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  public	  early	  on	  in	  its	  possible	  deal	  with	  the	  SFPUC.	  	  Brokering	  contracts	  
Focus	  on	  the	  details	  of	  dry	  year	  arrangements.	  Unsurprisingly,	  how	  agreements	  handle	  water	  deliveries	  in	  dry	  years	  may	  determine	  in	  large	  part	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  parties	  can	  come	  to	  a	  consensus.	  Drought	  and	  decreasing	  water	  reliability	  are	  primary	  drivers	  for	  water	  deals	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  As	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  case	  showed,	  however,	  when	  dry	  years	  strike	  is	  when	  agreement	  can	  become	  difficult,	  and	  the	  inability	  to	  come	  to	  a	  mutually	  acceptable	  arrangement	  for	  the	  three	  parties	  was	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  deal’s	  collapse.	  Because	  of	  their	  contentiousness,	  it	  may	  make	  sense	  to	  structure	  contracts	  in	  distinct	  ways	  that	  have	  specific	  clauses	  for	  dry	  years.	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  SFPUC	  might	  have	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explored	  additional	  options	  for	  dry	  years,	  such	  as	  paying	  more	  to	  have	  the	  right	  of	  first	  refusal	  in	  those	  years	  or	  pursuing	  unique	  arrangements	  devised	  in	  places	  like	  Colorado.	  	  
	  
Use	  all	  of	  the	  institutions	  available	  to	  you.	  Though	  the	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  case	  might	  contain	  plenty	  of	  examples	  of	  negotiation	  approaches	  to	  avoid,	  the	  city	  of	  Modesto	  exemplified	  protecting	  one’s	  existing	  interests.	  They	  did	  so	  using	  an	  institutional	  framework.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  with	  San	  Francisco	  could	  violate	  Modesto’s	  existing	  ARTDA	  with	  the	  MID	  concerned	  officials	  within	  the	  city.	  They	  pinpointed	  not	  only	  the	  precise	  language	  that	  might	  breach	  their	  contract,	  but	  found	  a	  section	  of	  the	  California	  Water	  Code	  to	  support	  their	  claim.	  Rather	  than	  dive	  straight	  into	  a	  costly	  lawsuit,	  the	  city	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  MID	  indicating	  the	  possibility	  of	  legal	  action	  while	  seeking	  a	  compromise.	  Though	  the	  SFPUC	  was	  unwilling	  to	  renegotiate	  certain	  terms	  that	  Modesto	  indicated	  it	  might	  be	  receptive	  to,	  the	  city	  did	  not	  have	  to	  pursue	  litigation	  because	  the	  MID	  board	  suspended	  talks	  (likely	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  SFPUC’s	  inflexibility	  towards	  Modesto’s	  concerns).	  Thus,	  the	  city	  protected	  itself	  from	  legal	  injury	  without	  having	  to	  sue	  the	  MID.	  	  	  Third	  parties	  
Build	  coalitions.	  One	  fascinating	  element	  of	  this	  case	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  so	  many	  interest	  groups	  from	  diverse	  backgrounds	  came	  out	  to	  vocally	  oppose	  the	  transfer.	  Farmers,	  urban	  residents,	  environmentalists,	  Tea	  Partiers,	  businessmen	  and	  city	  officials	  all	  publically	  came	  out	  against	  the	  deal	  and	  became	  involved	  in	  varying	  degrees	  in	  opposing	  it.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  third-­‐party	  opponents	  appeared	  to	  show	  some	  unity	  and	  coordination.	  The	  PAC	  stopMIDinsanity.com	  united	  agriculturalists	  concerned	  about	  the	  transfer	  and	  provided	  
	  	   87	  
information	  to	  foment	  opposition	  from	  other	  stakeholders.	  One	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  seemed	  disparate	  interest	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  and	  the	  Stanislaus	  County	  Farm	  Bureau	  felt	  simply	  fortunate	  to	  find	  themselves	  on	  the	  same	  side.	  This	  would	  not	  always	  have	  been	  the	  case,	  and	  environmentalists	  were	  unsure	  what	  position	  farmers	  would	  take.	  Out	  of	  this	  case,	  Peter	  Drekmeier	  of	  the	  TRT	  remarked	  that	  his	  agency	  would	  like	  to	  start	  working	  more	  with	  the	  agricultural	  community	  to	  build	  bridges	  and	  identify	  common	  causes	  they	  can	  collaborate	  on.215	  Forging	  bonds	  now	  will	  allow	  separate	  interest	  groups	  to	  avert	  certain	  conflicts	  in	  the	  future,	  while	  remaining	  aware	  of	  another	  stakeholder’s	  interests	  in	  a	  future	  negotiation	  might	  allow	  groups	  to	  form	  unforeseen	  alliances.	  	  
Opportunities	  for	  future	  research	  	   There	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	  tributaries	  for	  further	  study	  of	  this	  topic.	  To	  start,	  a	  more	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  negotiation	  dynamics	  could	  be	  conducted	  using	  specialized	  tools.	  This	  would	  include	  a	  robust	  stakeholder	  analysis,	  a	  coalitional	  analysis,	  a	  two-­‐level	  game	  analysis,	  and	  joint	  fact	  finding.216	  Alternatively,	  a	  study	  could	  isolate	  the	  economics	  of	  the	  failed	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  water	  deal,	  to	  determine	  more	  specifically	  how	  purchased	  water—which	  would	  only	  be	  used	  during	  certain	  years—compared	  with	  other	  means	  of	  securing	  water,	  including	  desalination,	  water	  recycling,	  efficiency	  measures,	  and	  demand	  reduction.	  Adding	  a	  further	  nuance	  to	  an	  economic	  analysis	  would	  be	  a	  study	  of	  the	  ecosystem	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  Tuolumne	  River,	  specifically	  the	  36-­‐mile	  stretch	  the	  Tuolumne	  River	  Trust	  feared	  to	  be	  endangered	  by	  the	  proposed	  transfer,	  and	  how	  these	  might	  be	  factored	  into	  water	  deals.	  A	  particularly	  focused	  comparative	  study,	  making	  use	  of	  the	  UCSB	  database,	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could	  contrast	  the	  approach	  towards	  dry	  year	  arrangements	  in	  this	  contract’s	  language	  with	  that	  of	  alternatives	  in	  places	  like	  Colorado.	  In	  addition,	  new	  courses	  of	  study	  can	  be	  followed	  due	  to	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  recently	  terminated	  deal.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  San	  Francisco	  to	  enhance	  its	  water	  supply	  with	  an	  additional	  2,240	  af	  transfer	  continues	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing,	  and	  one	  could	  potentially	  follow	  the	  events	  as	  they	  unfold	  between	  the	  OID	  and	  SFPUC.	  Independent	  but	  related	  to	  the	  discussions	  between	  the	  OID	  and	  SFPUC	  is	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  Bay	  Area	  municipality	  of	  Brisbane	  to	  directly	  purchase	  water	  from	  the	  OID,	  which	  could	  be	  another	  topic	  to	  explore.	  One	  could	  also	  choose	  to	  closely	  study	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  MID	  moving	  forward,	  now	  that	  it	  has	  brought	  additional	  stakeholders	  into	  the	  fold	  through	  an	  advisory	  committee,	  or	  investigate	  the	  feasibility	  of	  more	  local	  transfers	  between	  the	  MID	  and	  its	  neighbors,	  as	  some	  had	  proposed	  instead	  of	  the	  SFPUC	  deal.	  Such	  an	  investigation	  should	  further	  explore	  one	  of	  the	  key	  factors	  cited	  by	  interviews	  that	  this	  thesis	  could	  not	  fully	  delve	  into—the	  personal	  and	  territorial	  connection	  felt	  by	  those	  towards	  water	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  water	  management	  decisions.	  	  
Final	  thoughts	  Though	  the	  chapter	  may	  have	  closed	  on	  a	  direct	  transfer	  between	  the	  Modesto	  Irrigation	  District	  and	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission,	  the	  book	  on	  water	  management	  in	  California	  continues	  to	  be	  written—particularly	  for	  these	  two	  agencies	  as	  they	  look	  ahead	  to	  disparate	  and	  complex	  challenges.	  Out	  of	  the	  ashes	  of	  the	  terminated	  agreement,	  many	  in	  Modesto	  hope	  a	  new	  strategy	  will	  be	  forged—with	  input	  from	  the	  advisory	  committee—that	  grapples	  with	  water	  management	  dilemmas	  by	  the	  MID,	  which	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will	  feature	  an	  entirely	  new	  board	  and	  new	  general	  manager	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2013.	  The	  San	  Francisco	  Public	  Utility	  Commission	  will	  not	  experience	  so	  dramatic	  an	  overhaul,	  but	  its	  staff	  seeks	  to	  apply	  lessons	  they	  learned	  from	  the	  MID	  experience	  in	  a	  potential	  new	  arrangement	  with	  other	  irrigation	  districts.	  Indeed,	  the	  terminated	  SFPUC-­‐MID	  deal	  has	  implications	  for	  all	  of	  us	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  how	  water	  is	  managed	  in	  the	  future.	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APPENDIX	  A:	  Sorted	  California	  water	  transfers,	  by	  duration	  	  










1997 8,852 175,694 $85,333 100 Bureau of Reclamation Gary Lodge Wildlife Management Area
1987 250 4,871 75 Plumas County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dist.The Founders at Grizzly Ranch, LLC
1991 15,000 273,839 50 Yuba County Water Agency H.D. Perrett, Developer
1997 165,000 2,932,722 $1,849,000,000 45 Imperial Irrigation District San Diego County water authority
2003 3,000 51,477 40 WoodbrIrrigation Districtge Irrigation DistrictCity of Lodi
2001 62,600 1,025,025 35 Palo Verde Irrigation District Metropolitan WD Of Southern CA
2001 1,200 19,649 35 Kern County  Water Agency Western Hills  Water Dist.
1991 2,500 39,507 32 Sonoma County WA Marin County WD
2006 120,000 1,844,694 $103,320,000 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Rincon del Diablo Municipal Water District
2006 7,500 115,293 $193,725,000 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Valley Center Municipal Water District
2007 7,500 115,293 $193,725,000 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Rainbow Municipal Water District
2007 7,500 115,293 $193,725,000 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Wallecitos Water District
1993 6,925 106,454 30 Bureau of Reclamation Central Coast Water Authority
2007 5,000 76,862 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Olivenhain Municipal Water District
2006 4,000 120,000 $23,760,000 30 Cawelo Water District Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, Zone 7
2007 2,400 36,894 $61,992,000 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Sweetwater Authority
2007 2,000 30,745 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Santa Fe Irrigation District
2003 1,607 24,704 30 Nickel Family LLC Newhall Land and Farming Co.
1992 1,150 17,678 30 Bureau of Reclamation Tuolumne Regional WD
2008 40,000 40,000 $15,000,000 27 Semitropic-Rosamond Water Bank AuthoritySan Diego County Water Authority
1997 20,000 281,879 $45,000,000 25 Arvin-Edison Water Storage Dist. Metroplitan Water Dist. Of Southern CA
2000 12,000 169,127 25 Placer County Water Agency NorthrIrrigation Districtge Water Dist.
1999 11,000 155,033 $237,600 25 Bureau of Reclamation (i) Sacramento County Water Agency
1999 11,000 155,033 $204,930 25 Bureau of Reclamation Sacremento County Water Agency
1995 6,875 96,896 25 Bureau of Reclamation Central Coast Water Authority
1999 6,500 91,611 $121,875 25 Bureau of Reclamation San Juan Water Dist,
2000 6,260 88,228 25 Mercy Springs WD (i) Pajaro Valley WD (ii) Westlands WD (iii) Santa Clara Valley WD
1991 4,000 56,376 25 LA County Sanitation D #2 Central Basin Municipal WD
2005 2,289 32,261 25 City of Compton Metropolitan Water District
1989 1,500 21,141 25 Chevron Corp. ARCO
1998 716 10,091 $1,500,000 25 Grasslands Irrigation District Bureau of Reclamation
1999 500 7,052 25 i)Irr.Dist.(ii) Irrigators (iii)Water contractor Assoc.(iv)U.S. Forest Servicei)Irr.Dist (ii) Irrigat rs (iii)CA Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection
1990 11,250 140,200 $9,000,000 20 City of Thousand Oaks Pleasant Valley County WD
2007 2,912 36,290 20 City of San Diego Otay Water District
1999 3,500 36,329 $315,000 15 Byron Bethany Irrigation District Alameda Couty Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist, Zone7
1993 2,500 25,949 $437,500 15 Areias Dairy Farms Metropolitan WD of Southern CA
1990 1,400 14,532 $175,980 15 Shasta County WA Clear Creek Community Services D
2008 300 3,114 15 City of Sand City California-America Water Company, Inc.
2005 130,000 1,003,826 10 Yuba County Water Agency California Department of Water Resources and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
2004 35,000 270,261 10 Semitropic Water Storage District Castaic Lake Water Agency
1999 30,000 231,652 $1,650,000 10 i)Oakdale Irrigation District ii)South San Joaquin Irrigation DistrictStockton Eas  Water Dist.
1999 20,000 154,435 $126,500,000 10 Imperial Irrigation District San Diego County Water Authority
2001 20,000 154,435 $30,000,000 10 San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water Dist.Metropolitan Water Dist. Of Southern CA
1997 10,000 77,217 $2,500,000 10 Western Water Co. Santa Margarita Margarita Water Dist.
1997 10,000 77,217 $700,000 10 vii) San Joaquin Exchange Contractors WABureau of Reclamation
1996 4,000 30,887 $5,800,000 10 Elsimore Valley Municipal WD Western Water Co.
Quantity of Water 
Transferred Prices Length
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APPENDIX	  B:	  Sorted	  California	  water	  transfers,	  by	  size	  
	  










2004 200,000 4,000,000 United States Filter Corporation Imperial Irrigation District
1997 165,000 2,932,722 $1,849,000,000 45 Imperial Irrigation District San Diego County water authority
2006 120,000 1,844,694 $103,320,000 30 Poseidon Resources Corporation Rincon del Diablo Municipal Water District
1998 74,715 1,494,300 $4,856,475 Delta Land Reclamation Dist. (iii) Kern County Water Agency
1989 73,113 1,462,260 $1,316,034 Multiple WD's and Water Storage D's Multiple WD's and Water Storage D's
1998 65,355 1,307,100 $4,248,075 Delta Land Reclamation Dist. (i) Metropolitan WD Of Southern CA
2001 62,600 1,025,025 35 Palo Verde Irrigation District Metropolitan WD Of Southern CA
2005 130,000 1,003,826 10 Yuba County Water Agency California Department of Water Resources and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
1989 45,479 909,580 $1,104,685 Wheeler-RIrrigation Districtge-Maricopa Water Storage Districtestlands WD
1999 41,000 820,000 $47,150,000 Wheeler RIrrigation Districtge-Maricopa Water Storage Dist.C staic Lake Water Agency
1998 39,683 793,660 $2,579,395 Delta Land Reclamation Dist. (iv) other water agencies
2007 35,453 709,060 Private Entities Private Entities
2003 144,000 623,445 5339376 5 i)International Boundary and Water Commission ii)Bureau of ReclamationC ty of Tijuana, Baja CA, Mexico
2004 30,873 617,460 Various Mojave Basin water users Various Mojave Basin water users
1996 25,000 500,000 $25,000,000 Berrenda Mesa WD Mojave Water Agency
1997 24,664 493,280 Eastern Municipal WD various Irrigators
1996 22,167 443,340 $1,751,193 Eastern Municipal WD Ag and municipal entities
1998 20,156 403,120 $1,310,140 Delta Land Reclamation Dist. (ii) Coachella Valley WD/ Desert Water Agency
2008 60,000 387,793 30900000 8 Yuba County Water Agency California Department of Water Resources
2003 125,000 340,406 3 Kern County Water Agency Department of Water Resources
2002 16,972 339,440 Various agencies and Individuals/irrigation districtsVar ous agencies and Individuals/irrigation districts
2005 16,000 320,000 $48,000,000 Berrenda Mesa Water District Coachella Valley Water District and Desert Water Agency
2000 282,305 282,305 2174113 1 CA Dept. of Water Resources 5 SWP Contractors
1997 20,000 281,879 $45,000,000 25 Arvin-Edison Water Storage Dist. Metroplitan Water Dist. Of Southern CA
2009 14,000 280,000 $73,500,000 Dudley Ridge Water District Mojave Water Agecy
1991 15,000 273,839 50 Yuba County Water Agency H.D. Perrett, Developer
2004 35,000 270,261 10 Semitropic Water Storage District Castaic Lake Water Agency
1991 12,700 254,000 Department of Water Resources Castaic Lake WA
2004 12,216 244,320 Western Water Company and Private entitiesTown of Apple Valley, Apple Valley Ranchos WD, a San Bernardino County Service Area, and Private entities
1999 237,904 237,904 1882632 1 CA Dept. of Water Resources 5 SWP Contractors
1999 30,000 231,652 $1,650,000 10 i)Oakdale Irrigation District ii)South San Joaquin Irrigation DistrictStockton Eas  Water Dist.
2004 11,197 223,940 Various agencies and Individuals/irrigation districtsVar ous agencies and Individuals/irrigation districts
1995 219,756 219,756 $14,833,530 12 WD's and agencies 15 WD's and agencies
2005 50,000 216,474 5 San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Water AuthorityBureau of Reclamation, San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Authority, and Madera Irrigation District
1991 215,000 215,000 $37,625,000 State Water Bank Metropolitan WD of Southern CA
1992 10,000 200,000 San Joaquin Exchange Contractors Fish and Wildlife Service
2001 10,000 200,000 $10,000,000 BelrIrrigation Districtge Water Storage Dist.Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dist., Zone 7
1995 183,027 183,027 1 Bureau of Reclamation Central Coast Water Authority
1997 8,852 175,694 $85,333 100 Bureau of Reclamation Gary Lodge Wildlife Management Area
1993 93,000 172,925 11532000 2 Irrigators Metropolitan WD of Southern CA
2000 12,000 169,127 25 Placer County Water Agency NorthrIrrigation Districtge Water Dist.
2001 160,000 160,000 11600000 1 Sacramento River Settlement ContractorsWestlands WD
1998 8,000 160,000 $8,000,000 Berrenda Mesa WD Western Hills WD
2007 8,000 160,000 $32,000,000 Natomas Central Mutual Water CompanyCity of Folsom
1994 159,023 159,023 10734053 1 State and Federal water contractors State and Federal water contractors
2002 157,050 157,050 11778750 1 Yuba County Water Agency CA Dept of Water Resources
Quantity of Water 
Transferred Prices Length
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APPENDIX	  C:	  Interview	  responses	  
	  
INTERVIEWEES	  
FACTORS	  IN	  TRANSFER'S	  COLLAPSE	   #1	   #2	   #3	   #4	   #5	   #6	   #7	   #8	   #9	  
Pressure	  on	  MID	  board	  from	  varied	  opposition	   X	   X	   	  	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	  	   X	  
Culture	  averse	  to	  exporting	  irrigation	  water	  to	  SF	   X	   	  	   X	   X	   	  	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
Right	  of	  first	  refusal	  could	  not	  be	  negotiated	   	  	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	  	   X	   X	   	  	  
Concern	  with	  meeting	  all	  dry	  year	  obligations	   	  	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Threat	  of	  legal	  action	  from	  city	  of	  Modesto	   	  	   X	   	  	   X	   X	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Nature	  of	  swing	  vote	  on	  MID	  board	   X	   X	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Leadership	  issues	  within	  MID	   X	   X	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Long	  term	  of	  contract	  with	  no	  opt-­‐out	  for	  MID	   	  	   	  	   X	   X	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Fear	  of	  larger	  water	  deal	  down	  the	  line	   	  	   	  	   X	   X	   X	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
FERC	  re-­‐licensing	  /	  exhibiting	  "excess"	  of	  water	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   X	   X	   	  	  
Doubt	  about	  need	  and	  costs	  of	  retrofits	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concern	  about	  losing	  water	  rights	  permanently	  via	  deal	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	  
Lack	  of	  trust	  in	  MID	   X	   	  	   X	  
	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
PAC	  pressure	  on	  specific	  board	  members	   	  	   X	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  COLOR	  KEY	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  YELLOW	  =	  DIRECT	  FACTOR	  ON	  NEGOTIATION	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  RED	  =	  FACTOR	  WHICH	  DROVE	  THE	  OPPOSITION	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  The	  above	  table	  of	  factors	  was	  compiled	  based	  upon	  responses	  by	  the	  interviewees.	  They	  were	  responses	  to	  open-­‐ended	  questions,	  such	  as	  “What	  were	  the	  key	  factors	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  water	  deal?”	  and	  “Can	  you	  prioritize	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  board’s	  vote?”	  Responses	  varied,	  and	  therefore	  this	  table	  simplifies	  the	  wording	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  ‘Concern	  with	  meeting	  all	  dry	  year	  obligations’	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  general	  bucket	  for	  multiple,	  parallel	  answers	  to	  fall	  into.	  To	  provide	  anonymity,	  the	  respondent’s	  names	  have	  been	  removed	  from	  this	  table.	  The	  color-­‐coding	  was	  done	  by	  the	  author	  in	  order	  to	  differentiate	  between	  factors	  that	  galvanized	  the	  opposition	  and	  factors	  that	  had	  direct	  impacts	  on	  the	  negotiations	  (one	  of	  which	  was	  the	  pressure	  caused	  by	  the	  opposition	  itself).	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